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THE CASE FOR A POST-MORTEM ORGAN DRAFT AND A
PROPOSED MODEL ORGAN DRAFT ACT
THEODORE SILVER*

"The evil that men do lives after them,
The good is oft interred with their bones ......
-Shakespeare'
Every year in our nation 200,000 useful organs are consigned to the
maggots for ready conversion to swill. The law indulges us in this practice
while thousands anguish for want of the buried parts.
In the era of modern transplant surgery, human cadavers are needed.
Under prevailing law they are not adequately supplied. While medicine
advances at astounding speed, the law does not keep pace, and life-saving
surgery is hostage to its wariness.
Existing law looks to procure organs through voluntary donation but fails
to answer the need. This Article proposes a Model Organ Draft Act. Subject
only toexemption for religious objection, the organ draft would empower
the state to conscript every cadaveric organ suitable for transplantation
without regard to any contrary wishes expressed by the decedent while he
lived or by surviving relatives after he dies.
Section I describes the national shortage of transplantable organs and the
supply that might be furnished if all usable organs were in fact salvaged.
Section I1 traces the development of current organ procurement policies.
Section III examines the failure of current policies and introduces the proposed Model Organ Draft Act. Section IV compares the proposed organ
draft with the procurement policies that now operate and those that have
been proposed as alternatives. Section V addresses the constitutionality of
the proposed organ draft, and Section VI concerns the draft's compatibility
with American traditions of liberty and free will. All of these explorations
indicate that the proposed Model Organ Draft Act offers to resolve the
national organ shortage in a fashion that is medically, economically, and
constitutionally sound.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
B.A., Yale University; J.D., University of Connecticut; M.D., Yale University. The
author is grateful to Professor Jon R. Waltz for his critical review of the manuscript.
Separately, the author acknowledges the assistance of his research assitants, R. Leah
Turchin and Ronald Manning.
I Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, act 111, sc. 2, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
SHAKESPEARE (W.
2

Craig ed. 1935).

Cadaveric transplantation means implanting in a person a tissue or organ taken

from a cadaver. Grafting and transplantation are synonyms. See
CAL DICTIONARY ILLUSTRATED 603, 1475 (24th ed. 1982).

STEDMAN'S MEDI-

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 681 1988

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I.

TRANSPLANTABLE

[Vol. 68: 681

ORGANS: THE SHORTAGE AND THE POTENTIAL

SUPPLY

Thirty years ago, the living had little use for pieces of the dead; cadaveric
transplantation2 always failed.3 Transplant surgeons began seriously to solicit post-mortem organ donations in 1962 when pharmacologic immunosuppression lifted the curse of prompt, certain rejection. 4 Since then, control of
rejection and hence the utility of transplantation have been markedly enhanced by the introduction of HLA tissue typing in 19665 and cyclosporin in
1983.6
With the matter of rejection 1Setter in hand, transplantation is one of
medicine's newest miracles. Through surgical graft of kidney, heart, liver,
7
cornea, skin, bone, and lung, thousands now walk the earth successfully
3

See generally F.D.

MOORE, GIVE AND TAKE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TISSUE

(1964 ed.) (noting that the first successful transplant between
unrelated persons did not occur until the spring of 1962).
" In January, 1962, a surgeon performing a kidney transplant first introduced
TRANSPLANTATION

immunosuppressive drug therapy in an effort to prevent rejection. The outcome was

moderately successful and a number of similar procedures were consequently undertaken in subsequent months. Id. at 116-28.
5 Regarding HLA tissue typing and its significance to the advancement of transplantation, see J.

BARRETT, TEXTBOOK OF IMMUNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO

279-82 (5th ed. 1988); F. MOORE, supra
note 3, at 213-21. The contribution of HLA tissue typing to graft survival has not been
evaluated by controlled study since physicians began using Cyclosporin A in immunosuppressive therapy. See infra note 6. Nevertheless, organ procurement personnel continue to make immunologic match a priority in pairing donors and recipients. Cf. Denny, How Organs Are Distributed, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 6, 26-27
(Dec. 1983) (noting that while immunologic matching remains a priority in transplantation techniques, it is often unavailable for heart and liver transplants because of the
limited preservation time of these organs).
6 Regarding cyclosporin and its contributions to the development of transplantaIMMUNOCHEMISTRY AND IMMUNOBIOLOGY

tion, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. HEALTH SERVS., HEALTH
RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, REPORT

10-14
(1985) [hereinafter TASK FORCE 1985 REPORT]; see also Starzi, Iwatsuki, Van Thiel,
Gartner, Zitelli, Malatack, Schade, Shaw, Hakala, Rosenthal & Porter, Evolution of
Liver Transplantation, 2 HEPATOLOGY 614-36 (1982) [hereinafter Starzl].
7 Authorities deem an organ transplant successful if the patient and the organ
survive for one year. This standard follows from the widespread finding that death
attributable to complications of transplantation or rejection of the transplanted organ
usually occur within one year of surgery. See TASK FORCE 1985 REPORT, supra note
6, at 11-12 (finding that the "highest risk of failure occurs in the immediate postoperative period, with relatively few losses occurring beyond one year"). Success
rates for cadaveric transplantation of kidney, heart, liver, and heart-lung approximated 90%, 80%, 70%, and 60% respectively. See TASK FORCE 1985 REPORT, supra
note 6, at 12-13. For instance, of 6,968 kidney transplants performed in 1984, at least
TO THE SECRETARY AND THE CONGRESS ON IMMUNOSUPPRESSIVE THERAPIES
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disburdened of morbid and debilitating illness. They are sustained by organs
from the dead8 and from the dead organs still must come. But, because so
few Americans donate their bodily parts post-mortem, this nation now
suffers a profound shortage of transplantable organs. 9
For example, approximately 12,000 new patients need kidneys annually in

6,131 resulted in one-year graft and patient survival. See U.S.
HUMAN

SERVS., PUB.

HEALTH

SERVS., HEALTH

DEP'T OF HEALTH

RESOURCES & SERVS.

ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

&

ADMIN.,

REPORT OF THE TASK

17 (table 1-1) (1986) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
1986 REPORT]. For the purposes of this Article, where transplantation of a particular
type of organ is not usually successful, such organ-the pancreas for example-is
not considered in short supply and is therefore not included in this discussion.
Pancreatic transplant represents an effort to cure diabetes mellitus type I (also
called "juvenile diabetes" or "insulin dependent diabetes"). A pancreatic transplant
is deemed successful if, for a full year, the graft functions and allows the patient to be
insulin free. Telephone interview with Dr. D. E. Sutherland, International Pancreatic
Transplantation Registry, University of Minnesota (Dec. 1986) [hereinafter Sutherland interview]. Between 1966 and 1977, only 60 pancreatic transplants were perFORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION

formed worldwide. See Sutherland, Pancreas and Islet Transplant Registry Data, 8
WORLD J. SURGERY 270 (1984). Of these, only two functioned for more than one

year, and none functions in 1988. Id. Of the 189 pancreatic grafts implanted between
1977 and 1983, 39 functioned for more than one year. Thus, as of 1985, one-year
pancreatic graft survival was lower than 20%. Id.; see also TASK FORCE 1986
REPORT, supra, at 17, 19 (reflecting a one-year graft survival rate of 35-40% for
pancreas transplants). Since 1983, another 700 transplants have been performed
worldwide. About half of these were performed in the United States. These 700
transplants show a one-year graft survival rate of 45%; the success rate is thus
improving. See Sutherland interview, supra.
Despite these improvements in the one-year survival rate for pancreatic transplants, Dr. D. E. Sutherland, the world leader in pancreatic transplant, considers a
45% chance of insulin independence insufficient promise to justify transplantation
except in rare situations. Id. Therefore, although doctors continue to practice pancreatic transplants, it still results in too little success to warrant the conclusion that a
pancreas shortage now obstructs progress. Id.
8 For example, of the 28,020 kidney transplants performed between 1980 and 1984,
20,122 came from cadavers. TASK FORCE 1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 36 (table
11-2); see also Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015,
1016 (1985) (noting that "[d]onations made at [the] donor's death ...

are the major

source of transplantable organs").
9 The Task Force on Organ Transplantation, established pursuant to Title I, § 101
of the National Organ Transplant Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 273, 274 (Supp. IV 1986))
concludes, without describing its methodology, that the overall need for transplant
organs is three times the supply. TASK FORCE 1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 27. It
concludes, also, that the "[c]urrent availability of donor tissue (e.g., corneas, skin,
and bone) for transplantation

. . .

is inadequate to meet the needs of thousands of

people who could benefit from the therapeutic use of these resources." Id. at 27.
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the United States1 and only 5,000-7,000 get them.11 The nation thus suffers a
shortage of approximately 6,000 kidneys annually.
Hearts too are in short supply. The annual need for useful donor hearts in
the United States may be as high as 50,000.12 Yet in 1985, for example, only

10This is easier stated than proved. The Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA"), a component of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services, has maintained data regarding the need and supply of transplantable kidneys since 1978. See, e.g., U.S. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., END-STAGE RENAL
DISEASE PROGRAM MEDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM FACILITY SURVEY TABLES 9-10

(1983) [hereinafter RENAL DISEASE SURVEYS]. In assessing the need for kidneys,
transplant and dialysis centers are influenced by their knowledge of the limited
supply. Many systematically report a need that is roughly equal to their anticipated
supply. For example, a dialysis clinic serving 200 patients might anticipate a yearly
organ donation to its region of only 80 kidneys. The clinic then identifies only 80
patients as needing these organs, ignoring the 120 who remain dependent on dialysis.
The nation's renal transplant centers add to their waiting lists-their lists of those
patients officially deemed in need of organs-at rates little greater than those of
anticipated donation. Short supply, then, is a principal, and deceptively circular,
influence on Health Care Financing Administration data assessing organ need. Telephone interview with Dr. Roger W. Evans, Research Scientist, Battelle Human
Affairs Research Center, in Seattle, Washington (Dec. 1986); telephone interview
with Dr. Paul Tersaki, Director, UCLA Renal Transplant Center (Dec. 1988).
Because of this circular process, HCFA data regarding the need for donor kidneys in
fact reflect little more than the supply of donor kidneys.
The number of patients who would receive transplants in the face of unlimited
supply represents the true need for kidneys. In 1983, approximately 72,000 United
States patients required ongoing dialysis. RENAL DISEASE SURVEYS at 11. Of these
roughly half are true transplant candidates from a medical point of view. R. EVANS,
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE NEED FOR AND SUPPLY OF ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTA-

A WORKING PAPER 20-24 (report prepared by the Battelle Human Affairs
Research Center in conjunction with the National Heart Transplant Study, 1983)
(citing sources indicating that three-eighths of dialysis patients are suitable candidates for kidney transplantation); see also Cooper, Abrams & Blagg, The Potential
TION,

Supply of Cadaveric Kidneys Jor Transportation, 23

TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

AM.

416, 417 (1977) (assuming that approximately half of the patients diagnosed each year as having treatable end-stage renal
disease are potential transplant recipients) [hereinafter Cooper]. The number of
patients needing dialysis has been increasing by 6,000 to 7,000 each year. RENAL
DISEASE SURVEYS at 11 (reporting data from 1980-1983). Approximately 6,000 transplants are performed annually. Id. at 9-10. Thus, on an annual basis approximately
twice as many kidneys are needed as are available, and approximately 26,500 more
are needed to eliminate the backlog of patients needing kidneys.
" See TASK FORCE 1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 36 (table 11-2).
12 Research data gathered through the National Heart Transplant Study, conducted by the HCFA, indicate that as many as 50,000 heart transplants would be
conducted every year if the supply of donor hearts were unlimited. See R. EVANS,
supra note 10, at 20-24. In 1985, only 719 heart transplants were performed. See
SOC. FOR ARTIFICIAL INTERNAL ORGANS
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719 were donated. 13
Liver failure kills 50,000 adults and 10,000 children every year in America. 1 4 Conventional estimates indicate that 5,000 of these patients could
benefit from liver transplant each year.15 There is reason to believe, however, that most of these 60,000 liver disease patients would benefit from new
livers, and that the true annual need for donor livers may be close to
70,000.16 But whether the need for livers is 5,000 or 70,000, only 300-600

Organ Transplants: Hearings on H.R. 4080 Bejore the Subcomm. on Investigation
and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st

Sess. 60 (1983) (testimony of Dr. Norman E. Shumway, Surgery Professor, Stanford
University School of Medicine) [hereinafter H.R. 4080 Hearings]. The HCFA, and
all of the nation's transplant centers, impose very restrictive criteria in determining
which patients should receive the limited supply of transplantable hearts. See, e.g.,
Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 7072-73 (1981) (requiring as prerequisites for heart transplants
(1) no more than 25% probability of survival for six months without transplant;
(2) exhaustion of all other appropriate medical and surgical therapies; and (3) a finding
that "adverse influences," including the advanced age of the patient and the absence
of adequate external psychosocial support, do not render transplant success unduly
speculative); Jamieson, Oyer & Reitz, Cardiac Transplantation at Stanfjrd, 1
HEART TRANSPLANTATION 86, 86 (1981) (stating that Stanford's selection criteria
includes irremediable terminal cardiac disease with the outlook for survival not
exceeding a few months and a patient of age 50 years or younger, and listing
psychological abnormalities, systemic diseases, insulin diabetessis, and absence of
adequate external psychosocial support as contraindications of suitability for transplant). In comparing the number of hearts available for cadaveric transplantapproximately 700 in 1985-with the number of kidneys available for cadaveric
transplant-approximately 7000 in 1983-it is hard to see why heart donations
should be so few. Doctor Norman E. Shumway of the Department of Cardiac
Surgery at Stanford University, points out that fewer hearts than kidneys are suitable
for donation and that many families donate kidneys but do not donate hearts.
Telephone interview with Dr. Shumway, Professor of Surgery, Department of Cardiac Surgery, Stanford University (Dec. 1985). Whether these observations in fact
explain this discrepancy merits further study.
13 See H.R. 4080 Hearings, supra note 12, at 60.

"4 H.R. 4080 Hearings, supra note 12, at 20 (testimony of J. W. Williams, Assoc.

Professor of Surgery, University of Tennessee College of Medicine) (citing statistics
on the number of Americans who die annually of liver disease).
15 See R. EVANS, supra note 10, at 38. For ageneral discussion of the indications and
contraindications of the suitability of a potential receiver for liver transplant and for
information about the success rates of liver transplants, see Calne, Liver Grafting, 35
TRANSPLANTATION 109-11 (1983); Grendell, Hepatic Transplant and Resection, in
HEPATOLOGY: A TEXTBOOK OF LIVER DISEASE 1274-85 (D. Zakim & T. Boyer eds.
1982).
16 The American Liver Foundation and the National Heart Transplant Study identify
a yearly need for only 5,000 livers. R. EVANS, supra note 10, at 38. These 5,000 livers
would go to patients with chronic active hepatitis, biliary atresia, primary biliary
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livers were available for transplant in 1985. l 1
Lung transplantation represents an innovation whose potential beneficiaries cannot yet be quantified.18 Although 220,000 patients die each

cirrhosis, cryptogenic cirrhosis, Budd-Chiari syndrome, secondary biliary cirrhosis, or
carcinomaofhepatic duct s, and to alcoholics no longer drinking. Calne,supranote 15, at
109; R.

EVANS,

supra note 10, at 38; Grendell, supra note 15, at 1274-75.

Alcoholics still drinking are conspicuously absent from the candidate pool. Surgeons tend to exclude alcoholics who still drink from the candidate pool, since these
alcoholics are thought to be unreliable regarding medication and follow-up. Calne,
supra note 15, at 109. Yet, if livers were abundant it would be difficult to justify
withholding one from an imminently terminal patient because the patient might fail to
cooperate with the post-operative therapy. Unreformed alcoholics are not deprived
of other lifesaving treatments on this basis. It would seem that if alcoholic cirrhotics
do not "need" livers, it is because livers are a scarce commodity. Prevailing estimates of the "need" for livers, like the HCFA assessments pertaining to kidneys, are
influenced by the unavailability of the organ.
If alcoholic cirrhotics are added to the candidate pool, the yearly need for livers
would increase drastically, since for every 100,000 people, there are 40 deaths
attributable to alcoholic cirrhosis annually. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND RELATED PROBLEMS 164 (1982). With our
nation's population in excess of 200,000,000, the number of alcoholic cirrhotics who
might benefit from liver transplants exceeds 80,000 annually.
17 The number of transplants performed is a valid indication of the number of
organs available. In 1984, 308 liver transplants were performed; in 1985, 602 transplants were performed. TASK FORCE 1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 107.
"SLung grafting is accomplished through either a single lung transplant or as part
of a heart-lung transplant, a procedure in which the patient receives a new heart and
two new lungs from one donor. Until 1980, single lung transplantation showed little
success. See Veith, Lung Transplantation, 35 TRANSPLANTATION 271 (1983). Since
1980, however, the use of cyclosporin has led to major advances in experimental and
clinical lung transplantation. Id. Between 1983 and 1986, a University of Toronto
team performed eight lung transplants, and as of 1987, at least three of the Toronto
patients had survived beyond one year. Telephone interview with Dr. F. Griffith
Pearson, Toronto Lung Transplant Group, Toronto, Ontario (Jan. 1987); see also
Toronto Lung Transplant Group, Unilateral Lung TransplantationJ'r Pulmonary
Fibrosis, 314 N. ENG. J. MED. 1140, 1140-45 (1986) (reporting the success of two of

the single lung transplants performed by the Toronto Lung Transplant Group). There
is reason to believe, therefore, that in the future, single lung transplantation will
furnish a viable treatment for end-stage pulmonary disease.

As of December 1986, six centers in the United States practiced heart-lung transplantation. TASK FORCE 1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 165. This procedure boasts
greater success than single lung transplantation. By December 29, 1986, United
States centers had performed 81 heart-lung transplants, with one year survival rates
of approximately 60%. Telephone interview with the office of the Registry of the
International Society for Heart Transplantation, University of Minnesota (Dec.
1986).
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year of pulmonary disease, 19 transplant surgeons do not, at this stage of the
technology's development, include all of these patients in the candidate
pool. 20 Indeed, authorities hesitate to furnish numerical estimates of the total
population that lung transplantation might some day benefit. 21 Nonetheless,
as to those patients who are named as candidates, organ supply appears to
be the limiting factor. 2 As relevant technologies advance, lung transplantation may well become an important part of surgery's lifesaving resources,
23
and a lung shortage will likely limit its use.
Numerical data on the supply of and demand for transplantable tissues
such as cornea, skin, and bone have not been reported. Among professionals
in the field (including the Task Force on Organ Transplantation), however, it
is noted without question that inadequate donation limits the number of
24
tissue transplants surgeons performed in the United States.
Although the nation is short of transplantable organs, available data indicate that every year it buries 20,000 bodies with 40,000 usable kidneys,
25
20,000 usable hearts, 20,000 usable livers, and 20,000 usable lung pairs.

'9

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH

&

HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH

STATISTICS, BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND DEATHS

(1986).

The heart-lung transplant candidate pool is largely limited to patients with
primary pulmonary hypertension. TASK FORCE 1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.
21 Telephone interview with Dr. Frank Veith, Chief of the Department of Vascular
Surgery and Director of the Transplant Program, Montefiore Medical Center-Albert
Einstein College of Medicine, New York City (Dec. 1986) [hereinafter Veith interview].
22 Veith interview, supra note 21.
23 Even with respect to single lung transplantation, still an infant technology, see
supra note 18, experience foreshadows a lung shortage. Dr. Frank Veith of
Montefiore Medical Center in New York, reports that the seven procedures performed under his auspices were delayed by the extreme scarcity of healthy donor
lungs. Veith, Lung Transplantation in Perspective, 314 N. ENG. J. MED. 1186-87
(1986). Indeed, of 59 candidates he had identified, 49 died while waiting for lungs. Id.
24 On personal questioning, the American Council on Transplantation, the American Association of Tissue Banks, Tissue Bank International, and the Task Force on
Organ Transplantation were all unable to report studies or statistics that firmly
document a shortage of transplantable tissues. But each of these groups asserts that
severe shortages exist with respect to all transplantable tissues. It appears, however,
that no person or entity has gathered the data needed to substantiate the widespread
assertion.
25 Although approximately two million people die annually in the United States,
most of their cadaveric organs are not suitable for transplant. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986,
(table 81) (1986). Transplantable organs must come primarily from brain-dead patients whose breathing and cardiac activity have been artificially maintained. When
the heart stops and respiration ceases, oxygen deprivation quickly renders organs
unsuitable for transplantation. Telephone conversation with Dr. James Cerilli, Direc20
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With respect to hearts, livers, and lungs, the potential supply could go far to
reduce the deficit. 2 6 With respect to kidneys it might fully relieve the shortage.

27

The discrepancy between potential supply and unmet need is a problem
for which the law should offer a solution. it is for the law to resolve conflicts
between medical needs of the living and deep-rooted sentiments concerning
the dead. To date, the law of organ procurement has favored the sentimental
and failed the sick.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESENT-DAY ORGAN PROCUREMENT POLICIES

On its face, common law doctrine provides that cadavers are not property
and that they create no property rights in the decedent, her surviving family,
or anyone else. 28 This "no-property rule" arose in England. 29 Packed with

tor of Transplantation, University of Rochester School of Medicine (Jan. 1989).
Because organs must come from brain-dead bodies whose respiration and circulation
have been artificially maintained after death, donors must, first of all, die in hospitals.
About one-half of Americans do so. Bart, Macon, Whittier, Baldwin & Blount,
Cadaveric Kidneys For Transplantation:A Paradox of Shortage in the Face of
Plenty, 31 TRANSPLANTATION 379-81 (1982) (indicating that 60% of people who die in

the United States die in hospitals); Cooper, supra note 10, at 417 (noting that in a
study in Washington state, nearly half of the recorded deaths occurred in hospitals).
Medical wisdom also dictates that donors must be relatively young and free from
disease impinging on the organ to be salvaged. Though estimates vary, it appears that
about two percent of the approximately one million patients who die annually in United
States hospitals satisfy these criteria. See, e.g., Mertz, The Organ Procurement
Problem: Many Causes, No Easy Solution, 254 J. A.M.A. 3258 (1985); Russel &
Cosimi, Transplantation, 301 N. ENG. J. MED. 470-79 (1979); Cooper, supra note 10,

at 416-20 (estimating the potential kidney donors in Washington as 0.0032% of
the population per year); Bart, Prevalence ofCadavericKidneysjbr Transplantation,

in

1977 ANNUAL
124-30 (K. Sell, V. Pewy & M. Vincent eds. 1977). If two percent of one

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF TISSUE BANKS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE

MEETING

million cadavers are suitable donors, then the potential supply of single kidneys, a
paired organ, is approximately 40,000. The potential supply of hearts, livers, and lung
pairs is approximately 20,000. This estimate is consistent with that of the Task Force
on Organ Transplantation which suggests that the potential pool of organ donors is
between 17,000 and 26,000 annually, although they recommend further study. TASK
FORCE 1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.
26 See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text. The potential supply of hearts
and livers would meet approximately half of the estimated need. The need for lungs
is unknown, but a supply of this magnitude would dwarf the supply now available for
transplant.
27 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Cohen v. Gorman Mortuary, 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1964) (holding that there is no property right in a corpse but a quasi-property right to
possession of a corpse may exist for the limited purpose of determining custody for
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the bags and baggage of English jurisprudence, it reached the new world,
and in building their judicial systems the new American states adopted it as
part of the common law at large.3 0 Consequently, throughout its history,
American common law has provided that dead bodies are the property of no
3 1

one.

Despite the no-property rule, American courts also hold that the power of
disposition of the dead body rests with the decedent if she issues pertinent
instructions during life and with the surviving family if she does not. 32 In
reconciling the no-property rule with the individual's right to control her
own cadaver, courts have held that, whether or not the body is property, it
does give rise to a proprietary interest empowering the decedent to decide,
by will, its fate.3 3 Notwithstanding the English rule, it is clear that in all
American jurisdictions one may by will, or by contract, 34 supervise the
35
disposition of her own remains.

burial); Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetary, 10 R.I. 227, 238-39 (1872) (noting that while a
corpse is not property in the usual sense, it is a kind of property to which certain
persons may have non-ownership rights, as in the right of burial). See generally P.
JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND OF BURIAL PLACES 120-24
(1937).
29 Until the 1850s, disposition of the dead was, in England, a matter for the
ecclesiastical courts; it was not the province of the common law. P. JACKSON, supra
note 28, at 24-29. The province of English common law courts in the eighteenth
century was the enforcement of property rights. Id. at 116. In respecting ecclesiastical jurisdiction and acknowledging their own impotence to govern dead bodies,
English common law courts determined that the corpse did not represent
property of anyone. See, e.g., Foster v. Dodd, 3 L.R.-Q. B. 67, 77 (1867) (holding that
a "dead body by law belongs to no one").
30 P. JACKSON, supra note 28, at 28.
31

32

See, e.g., supra note 28.
See generally P. JACKSON, supra note 28, at 48-61.

3 [T]he body of one whose estate is in probate unquestionably forms no part of
the property of that estate, [but] it is recognized that the individual has a
sufficient proprietary interest in his own body after his death to be able to make
valid and binding testamentary disposition of it.
O'Donnel v. Slacks, 123 Cal. 285, 288, 55 P. 906, 907 (1899); In re Widening of
Beekman Street (unreported), discussed in Appendix, Law of Burial, 4 Bradford
Surr. 503, 509 (N.Y. 1875); see also Kuzenski, Property in DeadBodies, 9 MARQ. L.

17 (1924) (reviewing cases discussing property concepts with respect to corpses
and finding that cases hold no commercial property rights exist in the corpse, but a
right of burial usually persists nonetheless).
" See, e.g., Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Rossi, 35 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1929)
(holding that where decedent during life undertakes an insurance contract wherein
she consents to autopsy after death, the autopsy shall be performed over the objections of the surviving family and despite the absence of any related testamentary
instruction).
15 "It always has been, and will ever continue to be, the duty of courts to see to it
REV.
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Similarly, in the absence of testamentary directive, the decedent's spouse,
children, or surviving next of kin are entitled to supervise burial. 3 In
squaring familial rights with the no-property rule, some courts have conceded that surviving relatives are not proprietary owners and have characterized them instead as trustees who hold the corpse for the benefit of those
with an interest in its decent disposal.3 7 Still other courts have held that the
relatives have no property right in the cadaver but that they have instead a
"quasi-property" right born of "a duty imposed by the universal feelings of
mankind to be discharged by someone towards the dead .... ,s38 One court

that the expressed wish of one, as to his final resting place, shall, so far as it is
possible, be carried out." Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228, 231, 61 N.W. 842, 843
(1895) (determining that where the decedent's daughter had assented to his request to
be buried in her cemetery plot, the daughter could not thereafter seek to have the
decedent's corpse removed).
36 While most judicial discourse indicates that the decedent's own wishes take
precedence over the survivor's wishes, Wood v. Butterworth, 65 Wash. 344, 118 P.
212 (1911), courts have also ruled that survivors' wishes defeat testamentary instructions that contravene certain natural sentiments of the living. Thus, in New Hampshire, a husband could conduct a funeral though his deceased wife had directed
against it, Holland v. Metalious, 105 N.H. 290, 198 A.2d 654 (1964), and the California Supreme Court denied the validity of a testator's command that his body be
delivered to a woman other than his widow, Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 69, 63 P.
170, 171 (1900). Any privilege that might belong to the executor in this regard is no
greater than the privilege that belongs to the decedent. In the absence of a testamentary directive, therefore, the wishes of the surviving family are superior to those of
the executor. Decisions to the contrary have been "properly repudiated." P.
JACKSON, supra note 28, at 54. While there have been debates about priorities
between spouse and next of kin, under the prevailing view the spouse's claim defeats
that of other relatives. P. JACKSON, supra note 28, at 55-61.
31 Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 315, 56 A. 878, 879 (1904).
38 That there is no right of property in a dead body, using the word in the
ordinary sense, may well be admitted. Yet the burial of the dead is a subject
which interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many
matters of actual property. There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of
mankind to be discharged by someone towards the dead; a duty, and we may
also say a right, to protect from violation; ...

it may therefore be considered as

a sort of quasi property.
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 238 (1872) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
in original); see also In re Remains of Johnson, 94 N.M. 491, 494, 612 P.2d 1302, 1305
(1980) (declaring that there is a quasi-property right in a dead body that vests in the
nearest relative of the deceased); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hospital, 30 Md. App. 317,
328-29, 352 A.2d 334, 341 (1976) (stating that a parent had a right to the body of his
own child, permitting the parent to seek equitable relief from interference with
possession of the dead body for purposes of decent burial); Leno v. St. Joseph
Hospital, 55 111. 2d 114, 117, 302 N.E.2d 58, 59-60 (1973) (reiterating that no property
rights exist in a dead body in the ordinary sense, but a right of possession does exist
for the next of kin to determine disposition of the body); Thompson v. Deeds, 93
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ruled forthrightly that whether or not dead bodies are "property," American
common law would be "disgraced" if it failed to recognize that a surviving
39
family has rights in the cadaver.
Hence, while the English no-property rule still walks American soil in
some ghostly form, the early common law allowed, and today unquestionably provides, that the decedent has a right by will or contract to avoid the
fate of her body, and that if she does not avail herself of this right her spouse
and next of kin succeed to it. Statutes in every state invade this power of
disposition in one important respect: regardless of what the deceased or
surviving family might desire, coroners or medical examiners may examine
and dissect a body if the circumstances so warrant. 40 Absent a coroner's
statutorily authorized intervention, however, the executor or appropriate
survivor is entitled to receive the corpse in a condition unchanged, except by
41
natural processes, from the time of death.
This was the state of the law when cadaveric kidney transplantation
became feasible in the early 1960s. 42 Any surgeon who removed transplanta-

Iowa 228, 231-32, 61 N.W. 842, 842 (1895) (stating that a wife has unquestioned right
to properly improve and adorn the grave of her husband, although the wife does not
own the burial plot).
39 "The dogma of the English ecclesiastical law that a child has no... [sacred and
inherent right to custody of his parent's dead body] is so utterly inconsistent with
every enlightened perception of personal right, so inexpressively repulsive to every
proper moral sense, that its adoption would be an eternal disgrace to American
jurisprudence." In re Widening of Beekman Street (unreported), discussed in Appendix, Law of Burial, 4 Bradford Surr. 503, 529 (N.Y. 1875).
40 The most recent compendium of statutes on this subject was published in 1931.
See WEINMANN, A COMPENDIUM OF THE STATUTE LAWS OF CORONERS AND MEDICAL EXAMINERS IN THE UNITED STATES 111-23 (1931). There is no indication that
any state fails to specify by statute the circumstances under which autopsy is
mandatory, although a comprehensive survey on this subject may now be warranted.
Regarding states rights to perform autopsies, see generally Hassard v. Lehane, 143
A.D. 424, 426, 128 N.Y.S. 161, 163 (1911) (stating that the coroner can dissect a dead
body if authority to do so is expressly conferred by law); Kingsley v. Forsyth, 192
Minn. 468, 472, 257 N.W. 95, 97-98 (1934) (declaring that in an action by a spouse for
damages for wrongful mutilation of decedent's body, sufficient evidence is needed to
prove that the coroner wrongfully ordered an autopsy).
41 Foley v. Phelps, 1 A.D. 551, 555-56, 37 NY.S. 471,473-74 (1896) (declaring that
a surviving spouse is entitled to the possession of the body of the deceased spouse in
the same condition as when death occurred, for the purpose of giving it proper care
and burial, and the spouse may sue for damages one who unlawfully mutilates the
body before burial); Hawthorne v. Delano, 183 Iowa 444, 449, 167 N.W. 196, 198
(1918) (stating that although one has an action for damages for mutilation of a dead
body, the defendant must have knowledge of the mutilation).
42 Though surgeons did not actively seek organ donations from the dead until the
1960s when medicine could meaningfully address the problem of organ rejection,
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ble organs was subject to civil suit, 43 and possibly to criminal prosecution, 44
if she proceeded withocit consent 45 of the decedent or appropriate survivor.
Because of this legal restriction and because organ donations were inadequate to meet the medical need, the need arose in the 1960s for legal
innovation that would address the demand for cadaveric organs.
By 1968, forty-two states had sponsored "donation" statutes expressly
empowering the individual to bequeath all or some of her organs for trans47
plant. 46 These enactments did little more than reiterate the common law.
Indeed, they "were a confusing mixture of old common law dating back to
seventeenth century and state statutes that had been enacted from time to
time." ' 48 These donation statutes lacked uniformity, differing with respect to
donor qualifications, donee qualifications, and permissible uses of the donation. 49 Furthermore, the statutes failed to address interstate transactions; a

kidney transplantation between identical twins was performed in the 1950s. That
competent adults have the legal right to donate their body parts has never been
challenged, but whether a minor child has such right and capacity was challenged in
Massachusetts in 1957, when a minor child wished to give a kidney to his identical
twin in desperate need. See Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplant in
Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 892 (1959).

" See, e.g., Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985)
(holding physician liable for removing decedent's cornea for transplant without first
obtaining consent of relatives); Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 138 Mich. App.
683, 360 N.W.2d 275 (1984) (same).
44 Comment, Indecent Treatment of the Corpse as a Common Law Crime, 4 ARK.

L. REV. 480 (1949) (detailing the development of the common-law criminal prohibition of disposing of a dead body in any way that offends ordinary decency or
threatens public health); Recent Decisions-CriminalLaw: Mutilation of a Dead
Body: Cal. Pen. Code § 290, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1939) (citing state

statutes making mutilation of a dead body punishable by a fine or imprisonment).
11 Physicians varied in their interpretation of the word "consent." Some removed
tissue for transplantation on the strength of mere consent to autopsy. Vestal, Taber &
Shoemaker, Medicolegal 4spects of Tissue Homotransplantation, 18 U. DET. L.
REV. 171, 173 n.7 (1955).
46 Featherstone, The Uniform 4natomical "ijt4ct-The Law's Response to a
Human Need, 110 TR. & EST. 468, 468 (1971) (listing the states in which legislatures

had enacted such statutes).
47 Statutes in four of these 42 states addressed only the cornea. Id. These enactments did considerably less than reiterate the common law.
48 See Weissman, Why The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act Has Failed, 116 TR. &
EST. 264, 264 (1977) (stating that the Act simplified the procedures through which

organs were donated); see also Stason, The Uniform 4natomical gift 4ct, 23 Bus.

LAW 919, 920-24 (1968) (enumerating the problems of anti-mortem gift statutes that
predated the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act).
49 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 16, 17 (1968) (Prefatory Note)
(amended 1987) (citing the myriad differences among donation statutes and the
difficulties to which they potentially gave rise).
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surgeon wishing to remove an organ in State A could not be sure of her right
50
to remove the organ if the donor had executed her will in State B.
It was to these shortcomings that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Law addressed itself in 1965 when it began to draft the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (the "UAGA"). 5' In 1968 the Commissioners
approved the UAGA and by 1972 the District of Columbia and all fifty states
had enacted it,52 some with minor variations from the original. 53 The UAGA
was amended in 1987 to "simplify the manner of making an anatomical
gift."54
The UAGA, as amended, provides that a decedent who properly executes
55
a gift while she lives will prevail over her survivors when she dies. It
establishes a relatively simple donation procedure involving what is commonly called a "donor card." 56 If the decedent fails to make a gift, her close
relatives are empowered to donate her body parts provided they know of no
contrary wishes of the decedent or of other relatives standing higher on the
statutory hierarchy (spouse, child, parent-guardian). 57 Similarly, if a surviving relative authorizes donation, a recipient must refuse it if she knows of
objections by the decedent or a relative higher on the hierarchical ladder
than the one authorizing the donation.M The UAGA also subordinates itself
to statutes that specify circumstances under which the coroner or medical
59
examiner is requested to perform an autopsy.
50 Id. (noting that state donation statutes did not deal adequately with interstate
transactions).
51 See id. at 17.
5 See id. at 15-16 (listing jurisdictions that have adopted the Act and the times at
which they did so).
53 See id. at 16-18.
54 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1987) (amending the
UAGA).
55 Id. § 2(h). Section 2(h) states that an anatomical gift does not require the
consent or concurrence of any person after the donor's death.
56 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT, 8A U.L.A. at 3 (Supp. 1987) (Prefatory Note).
Under the UAGA, one effectively makes an anatomical gift by signing a "document
of gift." Id. § 2(b). A "document of gift" is simply what is commonly referred to as a
"donor's card." Id. § 1 (defining a "document of gift" as "a card, a statement
attached to or imprinted on a motor vehicle operator's or chauffeur's license, a will or
other writing used to make an anatomical gift"). The "document of gift" need not be
delivered or filed. Id. § 2(b). As originally approved in 1968, the UAGA required that
the "document of gift" bear the signature of two witnesses. The 1987 amendments
eliminate this requirement. Id. § 2 comment (noting that the deletion of this requirement was intended to simplify the donation process).
57 Id. § 3 (establishing (1) a hierarchy among surviving relatives who may have
conflicting wishes regarding post-mortem donation; and (2) the procedure through
which decedent's relatives may make, revoke, and contest anatomical gifts).
58 Id. § 6(c).
59 Id. § 11(b) comment (emphasizing that concerns for good medical practice and
law enforcement are paramount to the policies behind the UAGA).
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The authors of the 1968 UAGA describe the competing interests they wish
to balance as: (1) the wishes of the decedent during his lifetime; (2) the
desires of the surviving spouse or next of kin; (3) the interest of the state in
determining by autopsy the cause of death in cases involving crime or
violence; (4) the need of autopsy to determine cause of death when private
legal rights are dependent on such a determination; and (5) the need of
society for bodies, tissues, and organs for medical education, research,
therapy, and transplantation. 60 The UAGA definitively resolves the ambiguities surrounding state donation statutes and the common law. It does
little, however, directly to foster organ donation. Its chief effect is to define
the rights of parties interested in the decedent's remains.

III.

THE FAILURE OF ENCOURAGED VOLUNTARISM AND A PROPOSED
ORGAN DRAFT

That the UAGA has had any positive impact on the supply of transplantable organs is hard to assert or deny, but the rate of organ donation from
donor cards is low. 6' There is no question that since 1972 when the fiftieth
state adopted the UAGA, the organ shortage has persisted, and that any
62
relief wrought by the UAGA is small.
Indeed, the Commissioners on Uniform Laws amended the UAGA in 1987
because, according to their research, it was "not producing a sufficient
supply of organs." 6 3 The amendments, however, were designed only to

8A U.L.A. at 16 (1968) (Prefatory Note). If this
list represents the order of priorities, it is small wonder the organ shortage persists;
the need for transplantable tissue finishes fifth out of five.
61 A 1985 Gallup poll commissioned by the American Council on Transplantation
concluded that although 75% of the Americans surveyed approved of transplantation,
only 17% of them had actually completed donor cards. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT
ACT, 8A U.L.A. at 2 (Supp. 1987) (Prefatory Note) (citing Gallup poll). In Maryland,
where the donor card is on the driver's license, a 1981 survey indicated only 1.5% of
licensed drivers had completed them. See Council on Scientific Affairs, Organ Donor
Recruitment, 246 J. A.M.A. 2157, 2157 (1981).
62 See supra notes 2-25, 52 and accompanying text; see also, Weissman, supra
note 48, at 265 (citing various sources and concluding that the effect of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act on the shortage of cadaver parts has been minimal); Dukeminier,
Supplying OrgansfJr Transplantation,68 MICH. L. REV. 811, 866 (1970) (stating that
"[a]ll evidence indicates that the [Uniform Anatomical Gift] Act will not relieve the
shortage of free cadaver organs to any appreciable extent and that ... [t]he Act is a
placebo easily swallowed, but not a remedy").
63 See 8A U.L.A. at 2 (Prefatory Note to amendment) (quoting the prefaces to
Hastings Center Report on Organ Transplantation, Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues
60 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT,

Pertainingto Sold Organ Procurement, published in October of 1985).
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"simplify the manner of making an anatomical gift and require that the
intentions of a donor be followed."64
As an instrument of organ procurement, the UAGA embodies a policy
called "encouraged voluntarism. ' 65 Some argue that this policy ought not to
be abandoned and that it should, for many reasons, continue as the basis of
national organ procurement. Others regard encouraged voluntarism as a
failed policy and suggest alternatives. These include: (1) a commercial market in which transplantable organs would be bought and sold; 66 (2) a "presumed consent" system in which decedents and survivors would be deemed
to donate organs unless they affirmatively express an objection;6 7 and (3) a
"routine inquiry" scheme continuing the prohibition on organ removal
without the express consent of donor or survivor but meanwhile requiring
that hospital personnel approach surviving families and raise the issue of
organ donation.6
This Article proposes a straightforward conscription of transplantable
organs post-mortem. Subject to religious exemption, the proposed Model
Organ Draft Act 69 (the "Act") authorizes physicians and hospital personnel
to remove from any cadaver such organs as would be useful to a living
patient 70 registered with a central registry. 71 Organs would be evaluated and
removed without consent of either the decedent or her survivors. 7 2 This
Article suggests that this proposed organ draft is superior to encouraged
voluntarism and to the proposed policies of organ sale, presumed consent,
and routine inquiry.

GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. at 2 (Supp. 1987) (Prefatory Note).
See, e.g., Caplan, Organ Transplants: The Cost of Success, 13 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 23, 24 (Dec. 1983) (describing the policy of encouraged voluntarism).
66 See infra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text; see also Caplan, supra note 65, at
24; Weissman, supra note 48, at 267, 281-82; Dukeminier & Sanders, Organ Transplantation: A Proposal Jor Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 N. ENG. J.
MED. 413 (1968).
66 See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text. As noted in the Prefatory Note to
the 1987 version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, a majority of states have now
enacted some form of "routine inquiry" statute. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A
U.L.A. at 2-3.
69 See infra Appendix: The Model Organ Draft Act [hereinafter MODAl § 16
(detailing the procedures and standards for the religious exemption to the Act's
coverage).
70 MODA, supra note 69, § 13.
7' MODA, supra note 69, § 5.
72 MODA, supra note 69, §§ 9, 11(1) (permitting evaluation and removal without
consent of patient or family).
6 UNIF. ANATOMICAL
65
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COMPARISON OF THE ORGAN DRAFT WITH OTHER PROCUREMENT

POLICIES

A.

Encouraged Voluntarism

The policy of encouraged voluntarism has dominated organ procurement
since transplantation first began. It is the cornerstone of the UAGA and
operates, therefore, throughout the United States. 3 In defense of voluntarism, Professor Paul Ramsey argues that the opportunity affirmatively to
give organs does service to potential donors and to the society of which they
are a part.
A society will be a better human community in which giving and receiving is the rule, not taking for the sake of good to come. The civilizing
task of mankind is the fostering, the achievement, or the shoring up of
consensual community in general, and not only in regard to the advancement of medical science and the availability of cadaver organs in
efforts to save the lives of others. Civilization means living our consensual communities, not living in communities in which consent and
refusal go on, just as surely as we live our bodies, not in them. The
positive consent called for by Gift Acts, answering the need for gifts by
encouraging real givers, meets the measure of authentic community
among men. The routine of taking organs 74 would deprive individuals of
the exercise of the virtue of generosity. The moral sequels that might
flow from education and action in line with proposed Gift Acts may be
of far more importance than prolonging routinely. The moral history of
mankind is of more importance than its medical advancement, unless
the latter 5can be joined with the former in a community of affirmative
consent.7

With respect to the values Mr. Ramsey propounds, an organ draft is better
than the voluntarism he advocates. According to Professor Ramsey, the
positive consent that voluntary donation requires fosters "real givers" and
furthers the goal of "authentic community. ' 7 6 Ramsey writes that "a]
society will be a better human community in which giving and receiving is

7' See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. For arguments in support of
encouraged voluntarism, see P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 198-215 (1970);
Sadler, Sadler, Stason & Stickel, Transplantation:A Case for Consent, 280 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 862 (1969).
74 In using the phrase "routine taking" Professor Ramsey refers to the policy of
"presumed consent," discussed infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text. Id. at
210-11 (comparing the policy embodied in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to a
policy that would give effect only to patients' objection that their organs not be
used-i.e. "presumed consent").
75 P. RAMSEY, supra note 73, at 209-10.
76 Id. at 210.
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the rule," 7 7 and that the "routine taking of organs would deprive individuals
of the exercise of the virtue of generosity. ' ' 78 Giving is the essence of an
organ draft. An organ draft requires the society to express its donative,
civilized instincts where retentive and primitive ones might otherwise prevail. The proposed organ'draft is not, therefore, inimical to the values of
charity and gift. It effectuates these values, directing them toward social
progress and the common good.
In support of voluntarism, Ramsey writes that "the civilizing task of
mankind is the fostering, the achievement, or the shoring up of consensual
community in general. ' 79 Analyzed closely, two Gallup polls suggest that
the proposed organ draft would, indeed, reflect community consensus. In a
1968 Gallup poll, seventy percent of surveyed Americans affirmed their
willingness to donate vital organs after death.8 0 A 1985 Gallup poll indicated
that, although seventy-five percent of the Americans surveyed would be
willing to donate their organs, only seventeen percent had actually completed donor cards."' That seventy-five percent of the populace should say
"yea" to organ donation from an armchair, while eighty-three percent say
"nay" from the deathbed, suggests that most people believe they should
donate their organs post-mortem but cannot bring themselves to do so. The
legitimate role of coercive law in civilized society is to implement common
will and wisdom where voluntary' incentive is lacking.
Whatever the reason for the ultimate reluctance to donate organs,8 2 the
decision to give or withhold organs generates what economists have called
"externalities." These externalities make compulsory conscription a necessary and advisable means of effectuating the "consensual communities" of
which Professor Ramsey thinks so highly. With respect to any private
decision, an externality is a consequence favorable or unfavorable, that
impinges not on the decisionmaker but on some other party or parties. The

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, at A18, col. 2.
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1987).
Some scholars suggest that people hesitate to complete donor cards because

81
82

they are unwilling to contemplate death openly. See, e.g., H.R. 4080 Hearings, supra
note 12, at 145 (testimony of Donald W. Denny). This explanation is not persuasive.
Few adults resist other acts that require as square a meeting with mortality. They
execute wills, and they purchase annuity contracts, life insurance, and burial plots.
The reluctance appears to relate more to an aversion to invasion of bodily integrity.
People are generally disinclined to suffer dissection except where it is designed as
therapy for themselves or a loved one. Surgery offers therapy to the patient herself.
Even autopsy may be perceived by bereaved families as a final form of surgery
designed to let them know, in the end, precisely why their relative has died. Organ
donation does not have this type of benefit for the relatives or the decedent.
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decision to be buried intact carries externalities; 3 a person who chooses not
to donate harms patients who need organs but are unable to get them.
Furthermore, such person is entitled to receive organs from someone who
has chosen to donate. Thus, a potential donor has little incentive to give.
This constitutes a 84market failure and damages society by creating inefficient
use of resources.
These externalities might be partially internalized if patients who agreed to
donate their organs had priority in receiving them. However, even if such a
policy would generate more organ donations, it would not prevent the deaths
of those who need organs and have not agreed to donate. These deaths are
part of the social harm that an organ procurement policy should address.
The government's regulatory power is a well-recognized means of correcting inefficiencies due to externalities.8 5 Pollution control provides a good
example. In a society of citizens who believe that clean air is worth its
economic price, the public interest is best served not by voluntary purchase
but by a rule compelling such purchase.8 6 If the matter were left to voluntarism, few drivers would purchase the necessary equipment even if they
themselves (1) wished to breathe clean air, and (2) believe clean air to be
worth the price of the purchase. Why? Because no one citizen will reap the
benefit of the investment unless all others also invest. No one citizen,
therefore, will have a private incentive to adopt the good measure. One
emissions does not appreciably
driver's effort to control his own vehicle's
87
affect the quality of the air he breathes.
Environmental regulations, the military draft, and tax laws compel behavior in order to promote the public interest. The sense behind the coercive
power of democratic governments is to move society forward by public
decree where individuals will not, by private volition, act in their own best
interests.
The decision not to donate organs generates what economists term a negative
externality, or a harmful effect upon a person who was not a party to the decision that
created the harmful effect. G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 104-05 (1975).
When one party refuses to donate another suffers. The decision to donate organs
generates what economists term a positive externality, or a favorable effect upon a
person who is not a party to the decision. When one party donates another benefits.
84 "Private decisions will not lead to a maximum of satisfaction unless externalities
are negligible; or to use essentially equivalent language, resources are not used with
maximum efficiency unless all the results, good and bad, of an investment (that is, its
marginal social product) accrue to the person making the investment." Id. When
parties undertake an economic decision without taking into account the costs that fall
on others, they may undertake activities that harm society as a whole. Id. "[I]f the
parties to a decision do not reckon in benefits which accrue to others, they may spurn
activities which would be socially advantageous." Id.
85 See generally R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMics 45-49 (1988).
86 Id. at 45-46.
83

8 See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs 501-05 (1970).
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Moreover, the social value that Professor Ramsey attributes to voluntarism is gravely undercut by the fact that it does not work; people do not
give enough. The organ shortage persists. Whether this is because of externalities or because the Gallup polls are wrong and the community consensus
does not in fact favor organ donation, the organ draft is an appropriate
solution. Good law should not necessarily reflect prevailing community
consensus on the day it is enacted. Coercive laws can foster social
growth. As Rousseau wrote:
The general will is always right, but the judgment that guides it is not
always enlightened. It is therefore necessary to make the people see
things as they are . . . to point out to them the right path they are
seeking. Some must have their wills made to conform to the reason, and
others must be taught what it is they will. From this ... would result the
union of judgment and will in the social body. From that union comes
the harmony of the parties and the highest power of the whole. From
then is born the necessity of a legislator.88
Even in the face of public opposition it is likely the proposed organ draft
would ultimately serve society better than voluntarism.
B.

Commercial Organ Market

In the 1970s, debate and literature on organ donation focused on the
notion of a commercial organ market to alleviate the organ shortage. 8a9 One

88 J.J. ROUSSEAU,
(London ed. 1791).
89

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

35 (Hafner Library of Classics 1947)

See, e.g., Brams, TransplantableHuman Organs: Should Their Sale Be Au-

thorized by State Statutes?, 3 AM. J. L. & MED. 183 (1977) (arguing that state laws
should be passed to support a combined altruistic and market system of human organ
procurement and distribution); Frier, Organ Selling For Transplantation, 38 PROGRESS CLIN. & BIOL. RES. 141, 141-46 (1978-79) (discussing the hypothetical sale of a
kidney by a living donor for a large sum of money); Movrodes, The Morality of
Selling Human Organs, 38 PROGRESS CLIN. & BIOL. RES. 133, 133-39 (1978-79)
(noting that purchase and sale arrangements could be made before death and discusing the morality of selling body parts); Note, Retailing Human Organs Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 401-02 (1983) [hereinafter
Note, Retailing Human Organs] (arguing that "supplementing the [Uniform Anatomical] Gift Act's altruistic principles with a market system would substantially alleviate
the shortage of organs by providing a monetary incentive"); Note, The Sale of
Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182 (1974) (exploring the legal and ethical
implications of establishing a commercial market system as a means of eliminating
the shortage of human organs available for transplant); see also J. KATZ & A.
CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? 185-89 (1975) (describing
a market system for kidneys and concluding that such a system inaccurately reflects a
person's valuation of her life because of inequality in wealth distribution).
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commentator even considered its tax implications. 90 Thought was inspired
not only by theoretical speculation but also by the fact that during the 1970s
such a market began to bud. 91 In 1984, however, Congress felonized the
purchase and sale of organs implicated in interstate commerce, essentially
92
ending the debate.
Those who favored an organ market claimed it offered several advantages.
Proponents contended that an active market would go far to alleviate the
organ shortage.9 3 They argued that "common sense-backed by extensive
data on the relationship between economics and human behavior" and
"analysis of the interaction between economics and human behavior ' 95
indicate that many persons who would not donate their organs altruistically
might sell them for a price. This greater availability of cadaveric organs,
commentators argued, would reduce the need for live donation with its
attendant surgical risks.9 6 They maintained that the enlarged pool of donors

90 Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 842

(1973) (considering the status of organ transfers under income, estate, and gift tax
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and suggesting tax provisions that might
encourage organ donation).
91 See Brams, supra note 89, at 189 (noting that blood and sperm may be lawfully
sold despite the fact that they are defined as body parts under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act); Council of the Transplantation Society, Commercialization in
Transplantation: The Problems and Some Guidelines for Practice, 8457

LANCET

715,

716 (1985) (reporting that, consistent with a climate of commercialization, "instances
of brokerage of kidneys from living unrelated donors have begun to emerge"); Note,
Retailing Human Organs, supra note 89, at 401 n.49 (1983) (citing Kidneys and Eyes
Jr Sale as Well as Pints of Blood, Evening J. (Wilmington, Del.), Apr. 14, 1975, at

10, col. 1 (arguing that a commercial market system would be successful because
evidence indicates that potential donees would be willing to pay for organs)).
92 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §274e (Supp. 1986) (imposing a fine of
"not more than $50,000 or imprisonment of not more than five years, or both" on
persons selling or receiving human organs, if interstate commerce is implicated).
"I See, e.g., Brams, supra note 89, at 187 & n. 13 (arguing that financial compensation would "provide a strong incentive for some individuals to relinquish an organ"
and help reduce the organ shortage); Note, Retailing Human Organs, supra note 89,
at 403 (arguing that the ability to sell one's organs would substantially increase the
supply of organs).
9 Brams, supra note 89, at 189. However, no "extensive data" are cited in
Professor Brams's article.
'5 Note, Retailing Human Organs, supra note 89, at 401. The "analysis," however, is not disclosed in this Note.
96 See, e.g., Note, Retailing Human Organs, supra note 89, at 401-03 (arguing that

an organ market would substantially alleviate the organ shortage and that this would
reduce the need for living kidney donors who face not only the dangers of major
surgery but also the possibility that if the remaining kidney suffers future damage, the

donor may require a transplant); Brams, supra note 89, at 190 (same).
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between donor and recipient,
would also improve immunologic matching
97
reducing the incidence of rejection.
With regard to the increased organ supply that a commercial organ market
might afford, inter vivos sales could be made only of tissues with such
reserve, or capacity for regeneration, as would allow the donor to maintain
life. This means that inter vivos purchase and sale could not increase the
supply of hearts, lungs, or livers. As a workable solution to the organ
shortage, therefore, a market mechanism would have to provide for the
purchase and sale of post-mortem organs.
Because a potential donor cannot, in advance of her death, guarantee the
utility of her organs post-mortem,98 the value of her organs would be

speculative and might therefore bring too low a price to promote significant
sales. 99
In order for a market to function, therefore, sales might have to be made
by the donor's estate or surviving family. It does not seem safe to assume
that monetary remuneration, whatever the amount might be, would induce
families to donate organs in quantities sufficient to alleviate the shortage.100
Furthermore, a market system might result in distributional inequities,
wherein organs would be available only to the wealthy. In response to this
observation, one proponent of purchase and sale noted that it would be
"absurd" to dismiss a market system capable of helping so many simply
because some cannot participate. 10 1
An organ draft eliminates all of the price-based uncertainty that attends
the market system. Subject only to religious exemption, it will make all

usable post-mortem organs available for transplant. Moreover, if the availability of sellers' organs will reduce the need for live donation and improved
7 See Brams, supra note 89, at 190.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
99 Brains argues that payment to a donor could be made to that donor's estate after
death, or if the organs were removed during life, payment could be made at the time
of removal. Brams, supra note 89, at 187-88. It is possible that a system of agents,
brokers, and speculators could be fashioned which would allow donors and recipients
to buy and sell options on post-mortem organs. One who wishes to sell her organs for
donation after death might then receive some payment during life, and after death, if
her organs were needed, her estate would receive the additional payment. A potential
donee would pay for an option when she first became needy. At some point in the
future she would pay the full exercise price for delivery.
100 Of course, cost might be spread among the population via the mechanisms of
public subsidy or private insurance. Whether the price of organs is paid by the
recipient or by society, we cannot know what that price will be and, consequently,
who will be able to pay it. Free-market proponents may argue that organs should be
committed to the soil if that is where the "invisible hand" directs them. Proponents
of an organ market have never taken such a position nor even raised the argument.
Indeed, it would be inconsistent with their avowed desire to increase the supply of
transplantable organs.
101 Brams, supra note 89, at 191.
98
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immunologic matching, then the availability of drafted organs will do so
more effectively.
Proponents further contended that an organ market operated pursuant to
statute might foster positive change in social attitudestoward donation. 102 If
an organ market will improve the public's attitude toward donation, an organ
10 3
draft will foster even greater and more dramatic improvement.
Proponents of an organ market anticipated certain objections it would
likely raise. 1 4 These included the likelihood that a market system would
reduce the rate of organ donation 10 5 and that sale is in itself immoral or
unethical.1 0 6 Professor Brams argued that a decrease in the supply of free
organs seems a "reasonable price to pay for an overall increase in the
availability of organs." 107 Reasonable or not, an organ draft would occasion
no such price.
Cognizant of ethical and moral objections to organ sale, those who advocate an organ market urge that sale is neither unethical nor immoral. They
argue that a policy that supplies more needed organs is ethically superior to
one that supplies fewer and that "one who relinquishes an organ 'for money'
may well have an altruistic motive-specifically to acquire income to provide his family with advantages he could not otherwise obtain." 10 8
Furthermore, one author observes, that the transplant surgeons who object on moral grounds to the purchase and sale of organs charge a fee for
transplant surgery and that when an organ is transplanted many people other
than the donor will be paid for their part in the operation.10 9 "If you suggest
somehow it's immoral for the donor to get paid, then you have picked him
out from among all these other people as being the one whose contribution to
that operation is the contribution which should not be paid for." 110
But many people do believe that humanity is debased when one individual
endeavors not to keep, not to give, but to sell certain aspects of his or her
id. at 189.
See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
104 See Brains, supra note 89, at 191-93.
105 Id. at 191 (setting forth the argument that persons who otherwise would have
donated their organs gratuitously might not do so given the opportunity for financial
compensation). In addressing this concern one author notes that although the prospect of future compensation may reduce the number of people who would relinquish
organs altruistically, and hence the supply of free organs may decrease, individuals
who could not afford to purchase organs could be given the first opportunity to
receive organs donated gratuitously.
106 Id. at 192-93 (averring that an organ market policy is ethically superior to a gift
policy because "it benefits a greater number of persons, while causing little or no
harm to a significant minority").
107 Id. at 191.
108 Brams, supra note 89, at 192.
109 Movrodes, supra note 89, at 137.
110 Id.
102

103
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being."' Perhaps this is the reason that under state and federal statutes one
may not sell his life, his freedom, his children, or his sexual partnership.
And, right or wrong, federal law now proscribes the sale of organs as well.'
The debate on purchase and sale of organs is and ought to be moot. It is not
here contended that an organ market is inherently bad, only that, in comparison with an organ draft, it is an inferior solution to the national organ
shortage. It cannot meet our nation's need for organs.
C.

Presumed Consent

"Presumed consent," or "routine salvage," is a system in which all
decedents are presumed to donate their organs unless the decedent or her
survivors expressly state otherwise. The individual and the bereaved family
retain a right to withhold organs, but to exercise this right they must act
affirmatively. Presumed consent systems operate in fourteen nations: Aus-

tria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.11 3 In the 1970s
and early 1980s, several American authorities advocated presumed consent

"I It is true, of course, that monetary payment represents an accepted method for
the solicitation of blood and various hormonal substances and precursors. The
problems that arise in connection with organ sale do not arise in connection with the
sale of these substances. Blood, semen, and hormones regenerate; donation wreaks
no permanent or fundamental loss upon the donor and for this reason, I think, fails to
raise the practical and "moral" objections occasioned by the prospect of an organ
market. See generally Stewart, The Battle Over Blood Collection, 3 AM. J. L. &

77 (1977) (examining both the need for a safe and available blood supply and
the effects of government regulation, with the assumption that blood donation is
socially desirable); R. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO
MED.

SOCIAL POLICY 70-89 (1971) (noting that while blood donors give for various reasons,

including financial ones, blood donation, even though compensated, is generally seen
as desirable for the community); cf. Murray, Who Owns the Body? On the Ethics of
Using Human Tissue jfr Commercial Purposes, 8 IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS RESEARCH 1, 4 (1986) (noting that although the current system with respect
to body fluids and organs has been successful, the system is being threatened by the
commercialization of biology and the assertion by individuals of property rights in
their removed body parts).
112 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (Supp. IV 1986) (stating that
it is "unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer
any human organ for valuable consideration if the transaction affects interstate
commerce").
113 See Caplan, supra note 65, at 30 (in half of the countries with
a presumed
consent policy, doctors ask families whether they object to organ donation; in the
others, physicians proceed with organ donation unless a prior objection has been
made); see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1986, at A1S, col. 1(reporting that Singapore's
government proposed legislation permitting doctors to remove the kidneys from fatal
accident victims who have made no prior objection to removal).
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as a system that would increase organ supply without unreasonably burdening personal liberty." 4
In comparison to encouraged voluntarism-and, sub silento, mandatory
conscription-presumed consent is said to be more humane toward family
and society, more practical, and more consonant with the true public will.
Encouraged voluntarism often requires that survivors be disturbed in moments of deepest mourning to make the difficult decision of whether to
donate. Advocates of presumed consent argue that an express consent
system, such as encouraged voluntarism, cannot operate meaningfully at
such times. Proponents argue that a presumed consent system would implement society's better judgment-a judgment that is often not reached under
a system requiring express consent. As one proponent observes:
Almost always the potential organ donor has died suddenly and unexpectedly. Relatives or friends are in a state of shock, grief, and confusion.
In such situations it is difficult to see how families can have a real
opportunity to make an informed or voluntary choice. Basic factors
ordinarily held to be absolutely necessary for any choice to be informed
and free-time and suitable decision-making environment-are often
absent in a busy hospital corridor or emergency room. The capacity of
information under such cirbereaved family members to comprehend
15
cumstances is highly questionable.

Butler, The Law of Human Organ Procurement: A Modest Proposal, 1 J.
& POL'Y 195, 203 (1985) (arguing that a presumed consent
system would increase the organ supply and be ethically sound so long as it affords
presumed consent donors a simple method of registering objection); see also Caplan,
Organ Procurement: It's Not In The Cards, 14 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 9, 12 (1984)
(arguing that a policy of weak presumed consent would produce significant social
good while accommodating family choice and autonomy in an atmosphere of mutual
respect); Caplan, supra note 65, at 30; Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 837-42 (conclud"1

CONTEMP. HEALTH L.

ing that the organ supply would increase significantly if usable organs were routinely
removed from cadavers except where the potential donor or her family had registered
an objection to removal). See generally Muyskens, An Alternative Policy or Obtaining Cadaver OrgansjorTransplantation,8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 88 (1978) (proposing a

policy of routine organ salvage, with broad exceptions to protect the autonomy of
those opposed to it). It is sometimes reported that certain states have adopted
presumed consent statutes pertaining to cornea transplantation. TASK FORCE 1986
REPORT, supra note 7, at 30. These statements refer to the fact that twelve states
have adopted statutes allowing medical examiners to remove corneas from unclaimed
cadavers, after reasonable effort to locate surviving relatives and solicit their ap-

proval.

ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES PERTAINING TO SOLID ORGAN PRO-

A REPORT OF T HE PROJECT ON
Center, October, 1985).
"1
Caplan, supra note 65, at 25-26.
CUREMENT:

ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
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Relying on express consent at times like these, the argument runs,
denies the decedent or the survivor the chance to reach a decision that
conforms to her own better judgment." 6 Professor Arthur L. Caplan observes: "When we find ourselves in 'boundary situations'-when our lives
have become unraveled, we need ritual, routine, and automatic procedures.
These procedures ought to be those that reflect our collective judgment
expressed in more normal times. ' '" 7 Citing the 1968 Gallup poll, which
purportedly demonstrates that the majority of Americans wish to donate
their organs post-mortem,118 Professor Caplan concludes that a presumed
consent policy would implement the society's better judgment automatically." 9
According to one advocate of presumed consent, a system in which
medical personnel request organ donation from bereaved families is "callous
and uncivilized."' 20 "It is hard to imagine a physician reaching for a telephone and saying: 'Mrs. Smith, I deeply regret having to inform you that
your husband Thomas had a car accident on Interstate 5. He was admitted
here in a dying condition and he died five minutes ago. We very much need
his kidneys for transplantation. Will you give us permission to remove
them?'

"12

Advocates also argue that presumed consent is a less radical departure
from traditional humanistic values than is the policy of encouraged voluntarism embodied in the UAGA, because "by making the basic presumption
one which favors life, and by thus putting the burden of objecting upon
persons who would deny life to another, the policy of saving human life is
given first priority .....

122

Finally, advocates argue that presumed consent would be less costly than
encouraged voluntarism. Encouraged voluntarism requires advertising and
public education campaigns to remind individuals about the need for organ
donation. 23 "Though it is difficult to obtain exact figures, the Red Cross, the
116

See id.

Muyskens, supra note 114, at 96 (commenting that a "giving" policy has the
disadvantage of asking for family approval during the time of greatest grief, when
they are most likely to refuse, regardless of whether they would generally agree with
the procedure).
18 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, at A18, col. 3 (reporting a Gallup poll showing
that 70% of persons surveyed said they would be willing to have their organs donated
to medical science upon their death).
"9 See Caplan, supra note 65, at 25-26 (stating that there should be "ritual, routine
and automatic procedures" reflecting society's collective judgment during ordinary
times).
120 Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 831.
121 See id. at 831; see also id. at 838 (discussing the awkwardness of obtaining
consent from family members under an expressconsent policy).
122 Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 837.
123 Caplan, supra note 65, at 30.
117
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National Kidney Foundation, and the numerous eye banks located throughout the United States estimate their advertising and promotional costs to be
in the millions of dollars." '24
Presumed consent, however, insidiously exploits the citizen's regrettable
reluctance to dissent, even though dissent is her right. It would depend for
its success on the unhappy fact that most human beings are disinclined
toward active protest of that which is customary and routine. Exploitation of
one's reluctance to assert her rights is not a sound basis for social policy.
Furthermore, presumed consent represents conscription in disguise. It
gives citizens the impression that they have the right to refuse donation,
when in fact many would not. Because many families might be entirely
unaware that organs will be removed unless they object, organs will be
removed without their consent or prior knowledge. Surviving relatives might
then learn of the removal after the fact or not at all. In either event they have
no opportunity to protest the removal, and, in a very meaningful sense, the
organs are taken with no account for their wishes. The nation would fare
better with conscription plainly clothed.
The argument that presumed consent will spare families the strain of
making difficult decisions at the time of death is also spurious. Those who
know that organs will be removed unless they protest will need to decide,
just as they would need to decide under an express consent system, whether
or not to allow donation. A presumed consent system might amplify the
anguish by requiring the potential donor or family to protest donation,
presumably a less desirable decision from the hospital's perspective, at a
time when the hospital's good will is cherished.1 25
Presumed consent would permit society to procure organs without
squarely facing the pertinent questions of social priority. By contrast, the
proposed draft encourages genuine social growth. It rearranges priorities
forthrightly. It commits the populace unequivocally to a course of conduct
that promotes salvage instead of waste. Conscription presses upon the
society a social advance that conforms to its avowed belief that the living
come before the dead.
Finally, presumed consent systems may not effect the most important goal
of a donor system-an adequate organ supply. European countries that
follow presumed consent schemes1 26 continue to experience organ shortages. 2 ' This fact has dampened enthusiasm for presumed consent in the
124

Id.

People fearing to express wishes not to have their organs donated might have
additional anguish from knowing that their own fear to speak will cause their body to
be "violated" after they die.
126 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
125

127 See Stuart, Veith & Cranford, Brain Death Laws and Patterns of Consent to
Remove Organs for Transplantationfrom Cadavers in the United States and 28
Other Countries, 31 TRANSPLANATION 238, 239 (1981).

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 706 1988

1988]

MODEL ORGAN DRAFT

United States. According to the Task Force on Organ Transplantation,
"there is little support for this mechanism as a way of increasing the
availability of donor organs."' 2
D.

Routine Inquiry

That presumed consent has not taken root in America is of little concern to
most procurement authorities, for an emerging wisdom now attributes inadequate organ supply not to a dearth of consents but to a dearth of
requests. 1 9 It has been reported that most hospitals fail to ask for organs
when a potential donor is dying or dead. 130 This insight fuels a movement
toward the "routine inquiry" policy, the latest in organ procurement pro131
posals.
The routine inquiry scheme provides that, where feasible, designated
hospital personnel must ask the survivors of a potential donor whether the
deceased's organs might be used for transplantation. Proponents argue that
routine inquiry will, at a minimum, salvage the organs of all persons whose
survivors are in fact willing to donate. 132 Furthermore, it is urged, the
scheme represents a policy option that will "accommodate both individual
' 133
autonomy and community good.

By 1987, a majority of states had enacted a variety of routine inquiry laws
that "require hospital administrators to discuss with next of kin the option of
donating, or requesting the donation of, organs of a decedent.' '1 34 In addition, some hospitals have, on their own, initiated routine inquiry policies. 135
1986 REPORT, supra note 7, at 31.
See, e.g., id. at 12 (arguing in favor of a required request policy); Muyskens,

128 TASK FORCE
129

supra note 114, at 90 (noting that although 70% of adult Americans profess a
willingness to donate organs post-mortem, few take steps to do so).
130 See, e.g., Caplan, Requests, Gifts, and Obligations: The Ethics of' Organ
Procurement 18 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 49 (Supp. 2 1986) (noting that if the

request were made most families would willingly donate organs of a deceased
relative, but that in most instances hospitals do not make the request); Caplan, Organ
Procurement: It's Not In The Cards, supra note 114, at 12 (noting that even if a

deceased person has signed a donor card, American physicians are unwilling to
remove organs without the family's consent and that this is an indication of their
reluctance to disturb bereaved families).
131

See, e.g., Caplan, Organ Procurement: It's Not in the Cards, supra note 114,

at 9.
132 See id.
133 Id; see also Muyskens, supra note 114, at 95 (arguing that a policy of routine
salvage would save lives and, at the same time, allow for nonparticipation by those
who object).
134 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. at 3 (Supp. 1987) (Prefatory Note).

135See Oh & Uniewski, Enhancing Organ Recovery by Initiation of Required
Request Within a Major Medical Center, 18 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 426-28 (1986)

(reporting that Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit initiated a program of routine inquiry).

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 707 1988

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68: 681

Since October of 1987, the federal government has denied Medicare participation to hospitals that fail to "assure that families of potential organ donors
are made aware of the option of organ or tissue donation and their option to
136
decline.'
Preliminary data suggest that routine inquiry may increase organ donation. The Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit initiated its own routine inquiry
system in 1985 and between January and September received twenty-nine
consents. During the same nine-month period in 1984, the hospital received
only nine donations. 137 This report indicates that routine inquiry might be
effective.
Other data, however, suggest that the routine inquiry policy will never
fully alleviate the organ shortage. Where required request systems operate,
approximately sixty percent of those who are asked agree to donate organs.138 Even if, under a required request plan, all families of decedents with
usable organs were asked to donate the organs of dead or dying patients and
even if sixty percent of these families consented to removal of every trans139
plantable organ, some organ shortages would persist.
As an organ procurement device, a routine inquiry scheme with a sixty
percent consent rate is inferior to a draft which exploits 100% of the available organ pool. Nevertheless, in comparing routine inquiry to the proposed
organ draft, one might suggest that the nation should first experiment with
routine inquiry, evaluate its efficacy and, if it fails to alleviate the shortage,
then consider a measure so extreme as the draft.
The trouble is, though; that adults and children will die while this experiment proceeds. Why then should the nation not first enact a draft? One who
136 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 provides, in part:
(1) The Secretary shall provide that a hospital meeting the requirements of
subchapter XVIII or XIX ... [is eligible for certain types of federal funding and
reimbursement programs] only if(A) the hospital establishes written protocols for the identification of potential
organ donors that(i) assure that families of potential organ donors are made aware of the option
of organ or tissue donation and their option to decline,
(ii) encourage discretion and sensitivity with respect to the circumstances,
views, and beliefs of such families ....
Id.
137 Oh & Uniewski, supra note 135, at 426 (reporting the number of organ donations at Henry Ford Hospital during 1984 and 1985).

138

Caplan, Requests, Gifts, and Obligations: The Ethics of Organ Procurement,

supra note 130, at 53 (noting that when families are asked to donate, over 60%
consent, and concluding that the level of altruism is high both in theory and in deed).
139 There are 20,000 potential organ donors each year in the United States. See
supra note 25 and accompanying text. If 60% of these potential donors gave all of
their usable organs for transplantation, the kidney shortage might well disappear. The
heart and liver shortage, however, might not. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
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rejects this suggestion must believe that an organ draft poses so extreme a
threat to personal liberty as to make it an unacceptable step now-or
perhaps at any time-even though it will almost certainly better promote
health than any procurement system yet proposed or extant. Indeed, all
objections to the organ draft would probably relate to the matter of personal
rights and liberty. "Personal liberty" denotes matters of constitutional and
non-constitutional dimension.
V.

CHALLENGES TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ORGAN DRAFT

The constitutionality of an organ draft might be challenged under the first
amendment right to free exercise of religion, 14 0 the fifth amendment right to
and the constitutional right to privacy. 142
"just compensation,"''
A.

First Amendment Challenges

The first amendment forbids the government to prohibit free exercise of
religion.14 3 The proposed Model Organ Draft Act exempts from participation
any person who objects to organ donation on religious grounds and does not,
therefore, conflict with the first amendment.
It is not clear that an organ draft act would violate the first amendment
without such an exemption. The United States Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on a first amendment free exercise challenge to legislation requiring the
individual to submit to medical treatment or procedures.1 44 Several federal

140 The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST.
amend. I, cl. 1. Federal and state governments are equally constrained by the first
amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
141 The fifth amendment states that private property shall not "be taken for public
use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142

See injra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.

Freedom to act in the exercise of religion is subject to regulation by the state for
the protection of society. Such regulation, however, must be in furtherance of a
permissible end and must not unduly infringe the protected freedom. Cantwell, 310
U.S. at 307-08.
144Although some courts cite Jacobson v. Massachusetts as authority for the
proposition that public health and safety may justify government intrusion on religious freedom, Jacobson arose when the first amendment was not yet applicable to
the states; and, the Court did not refer to religious freedom or the first amendment.
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (sustaining regulation requiring all adult citizens of Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to receive smallpox vaccinations, notwithstanding that exposure to
vaccination carried statistical possibility of serious illness and even death); cf. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24 (1961)
(noting that in free exercise challenges, California and Maryland courts have relied
upon dicta of the Supreme Court in Jacobson).
143
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district courts, however, have ruled on first amendment challenges to medically oriented legislation.1 5 One, for example, ruled that the state may
mandate blood transfusions for minor children despite the parents' religious
objections. 4 6 According to this district court, the "right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose .

.

. the child .

.

. to ill health or

death.' 1 47 Similarly, a state appellate court held that compulsory vaccination and quarantine laws are constitutional notwithstanding religious objections, on the grounds that free exercise of religion does not embody a right to
"hurt or harm the overwhelming majority of the community.' ' 1 48 These
decisions lend support to the argument that an organ draft is viable under the
free exercise clause because the individual's refusal to donate organs ex149
poses others to ill health or death.
On the other hand, several Supreme Court decisions suggest that an organ
draft would violate the first amendment if it did not exempt those who
opposed organ donation on religious grounds. Looking to the first amendment, the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes that burden religious
practice when the state advances "no compelling state interest as justification.' 150 The Court has further indicated that, in relation to the secular
145 See, e.g., Staelens v. Yake, 432 F. Supp. 834, 834-39 (N.D. 111. 1977) (holding
that a court order removing son from parents' custody and appointing guardian to
consent to medical treatment did not deprive parents of their religious freedom);
Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Kan. 1978) (holding that defendants did
not act in arbitrary or capricious manner by administering psychotropic drugs against
plaintiff's will where plaintiff articulated vague religious objections); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. 278 F. Supp. 488, 504-05 (W.D. Wash. 1967), afJ'd, 390
U.S. 598 (1968) (stating that Washington statutes empowering superior court judges
to authorize blood transfusions of children, against the objections of their parents,
are not invalid under the United States Constitution).
146 Jehovah's Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 504-05.
47 Id. at 504 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that "the family is not
beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty")
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
148 See In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1944).
149 With respect to the federal and state decisions just cited, those supporting the
organ draft would undoubtedly note the draft's status as promoter of health and
welfare. Opponents, on the other hand, might draw the dubious distinction between
law that prohibits the citizen from generating disease, and law that affirmatively
requires one to cure it. It is difficult to imagine a logical constitutional argument that
would render such a distinction relevant.
150 Sherbert v.Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1964). In Sherbert v. Verner, an employer discharged a Seventh Day Adventist employee because she refused to work
on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. Id. at 399. A state statute denied
unemployment benefits to any person who resigned employment without good cause;
the state determined that religious faith was not "good cause." Id. at 399-401. The
Court held the statute invalid because it violated the petitioner's right to exercise her
religion freely and advanced no compelling state interest as justification. Id. at 403;
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purposes for which they are designed, such statutes must impose as small a
burden on religious practice as is possible."' As Professor Jesse Dukeminier
writes, an organ draft that places an indirect burden on religion would not be
constitutional if other methods of obtaining an adequate organ supply were
available.1 52 Faced with a first amendment challenge to theproposed organ
draft, the Court would likely require the state to show that it had no available
legal device that would procure needed organs without burdening religious
practice. It would be "plainly incumbent" upon the state to "demonstrate
that no alternative forms of regulation" would serve its purpose "without
infringing on First Amendment rights." 153
A simple exemption from the organ draft for those opposed to donation on
religious grounds would not likely frustrate procurement to any significant
degree 5 4 and is probably essential to its constitutionality. Therefore, the
see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1980) (refusing to overrule
Sherbert v. Verner, and holding that a state's asserted concern over widespread

unemployment and fraudulent claims on its treasury do not permit the state to
withhold unemployment compensation from Mr. Thomas, who resigned his employment on religious grounds when directed to manufacture military equipment). In 1972
the Supreme Court held that the state's interest in mandating public education
through tenth grade was not so "compelling" as to justify the attending burden on the
Amish who opposed high school education on religious grounds. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-19, 234-35 (1972).
'5' For example, the Supreme Court found in Sherbert v. Verner that the state
advanced no compelling state interest that could not be fulfilled by some means less
burdensome upon the free exercise of religion and that the state failed to demonstrate
that "no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing
on First Amendment rights." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-07. Similarly, in Wisconsin v.

Yoder, the Supreme Court ruled that an exemption for the Amish would not destroy
the state's ability to fulfill its objective and that the state's interests could be served
by means other than denial of religious exemptions. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216-19,
234-35; see also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)
(holding that the right to perform religious acts, although not absolute, is susceptible
of restriction by the state "only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the state may lawfully protect").
152 Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 836.
153 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
15 Most lines of theological authority in the Judeo-Christian tradition deem voluntary cadaveric organ donation by an individual to be permissible. For arguments
Supporting this statement, see H.R. 4080 Hearings, supra note 12, at 343 (testimony
of Robert Veatch). See also Rosner, Organ Transplants: The Jewish Viewpoint, 3 J.
THANATOLOGY 1,233, 237-41 (1975); Rabinovitch, What is the Halakhah or Organ
Transplants, in JEWISH BIOETHICs 351-57 (F.Rosner & J.Bleitch 1979); Pope Pius

XII, Allocation to a Group of Eye Specialists (May 14, 1965), reprinted in B.ASHLEY
& K. O'RoURKE, HEALTH CARE ETHICS: A THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 311 (1978). But
see 1.JAKOBOVITZ, JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS 152 (1959) (noting that organs can be
removed but not transplanted, since the Judaic rule requires that all parts of the body
be buried).
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proposed Act exempts from participation any "person who ...

has a reli-

gious objection to conscription of her own organs or those of her minor child
.... 155 The Act is thus compatible with the first amendment.
B.

Fifth Amendment Challenges

The fifth amendment forbids the government to take private property for
public use without just compensation.1 56 If post-mortem removal amounts to
a "taking" and if organs are "property," then the proposed draft would
occasion compensation and would be permissible only if the taking is "for a
public use.'

'1 57

Legal literature features sophisticated debate on the question of whether
15
given governmental interferences constitute fifth amendment takings.
There is no question, however, that a thing is "taken" under the fifth
amendment when it is physically invaded, occupied, or appropriated in the
ordinary sense of those words. 159 Post-mortem removal of organs would
155See MODA, supra note 69, § 16. Dukeminier states that '[d]etermining what is
a 'religious belief' is clearly a matter that everyone would be wise to avoid" and he
seeks to avoid this determination by suggesting that an organ draft statute should
permit a person to refuse organ removal for any reason. See Dukeminier, supra note
62, at 836-37. Such a broad exemption goes too far and is not necessary to avoid
constitutional implications.
156 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides "nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.

amend. V. State governments, like the federal government, are bound by this provision. See Chicago, B&Q R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (holding that the
fourteenth amendment protects the right to compensation for private property taken
by a state).
157 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "one person's property may not
be taken for the benefit of another private person without ajustifying public purpose,
even though compensation be paid." Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
241 (quoting Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)). "Public
use" is broadly interpreted; as the Court states in Midkiff, the "public use" requirement is "coterminus with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Id. at 240.
158 Regarding the meaning of "taking"
and "property" under the fifth amendment's takings clause, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); J. GELIN & D. MILLER, THE
FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 2 (1982); Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
159 The modern significance of physical occupation is that courts, while they
sometimes do hold nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny compensation for a physical takeover. The one incontestable case for compensation (short
of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately
brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, "regularly" use, or
"permanently" occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be
under private ownership.
Michelman, supra note 158, at 1184 (emphasis in original).
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therefore constitute a "taking" under the fifth amendment. Considerable
doubt remains, however, on the characterization of cadaveric organs as
"property."
Property is perhaps the most basic principle of social order; it is to the
universe of law what "existence" and "being" are to the universe. Because
no philosopher has yet reduced the words "existence" and "being" to more
fundamental terms, 160 it is not surprising that a constitutional definition of

"property" is not readily at hand.
Hobbesian thought holds that private property is whatever the state pro1 61
claims it to be and that property exists at the suffrance of the sovereign.
This thought has held some sway in fifth amendment interpretation. As the
Supreme Court has written: "[N]ot all economic interests are 'property
rights'; only those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law [in]
back of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compel
others to forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their

invasion."'162

On the other hand, scholars and judges have urged that the word "property" as used in the fifth amendment cannot be subject to final interpretation
by state and federal legislatures. Realty and personalty held in traditional

160

There have, of course, been heroic efforts in this regard. See generally J.P.

SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS

Second Meditation, in

(H. Barnes trans. 1970); R.

MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

DESCARTES,

The

(E. Haldane & G.Ross

trans. 1955) (2d ed. 1642).
161 Hobbes avers that when individuals band together to form a governed society,
they give up all rights to self-government. It is "as if every man should say to every
man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself" to this man, or to this
assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy rights to him, and authorize

all his actions in like manner." T.

HOBBES, LEVIATHAN

132 (Collier ed. 1962)

(originally published in 1651) (emphasis in original).
162 United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945); see also Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 341 (1893) (ruling that the
federal government must compensate state-created property rights, in this case a
franchise to exact tolls and complete certain construction along the Monongahela
River. The Court states:

The franchise is a vested right. The State has power to grant it. It may retake it,
as it may take other private property, for public uses, upon the payment of just
compensation. A like, though a superior, power exists in the national govern-

ment. It may take it for public purposes, and take it even against the will of the
State; but it can no more take the franchise which the State has given than it can
any private property belonging to an individual.
Id.
Similarly, in Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission, the Court looked to
Wisconsin state law to decide whether a riparian proprietor acquires property rights
over navigable areas of the river: "If the state chooses to resign to the riparian
proprietor sovereign rights over navigable rivers which it acquired upon assuming
statehood, it is not for others to raise objections." 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927).
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forms, for example, seem certain to qualify as private property under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments apart from any state notions to the contrary. 163 In its nature, some argue, the Constitution rejects the "crude
Hobbesian conception" that property has only such dimension as the state
may give it. The fifth amendment would be meaningless if it delegated to the
state the task of defining "private property.' 1 4 In limiting the state's power
over private property, it is said, the Constitution endorses the Lockean
notion 165 that private property has a meaning independent of the sovereign.
As Justice Marshall has written:
The constitutional terms 'life, liberty, and property' do not derive their
meaning solely from the provisions of positive law. They have a normative dimension as well, establishing a sphere of private autonomy which
government is bound to respect. Quite serious constitutional questions
might be raised if a legislature attempted to166abolish certain categories of
common-law rights in some general way.
Whether "property" under the fifth amendment is defined according to
positive law or "the sphere of private autonomy which government is bound
to respect," 167 it is evident that post-mortem organs do not qualify. First, the
common law expressly rejects the notion that dead bodies are the surviving
family's property, at most conferring upon them the status of "quasi-property. ' 168 Regarding the donor himself, it might be argued that one's organs
are his own property during life. Clearly, his testamentary powers of disposal, however, are not. The power to make a will is, in all common-law
jurisdictions (except, perhaps, Wisconsin169), "in no sense a property right
J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.5, at 473
(noting that "[t]he most difficult issues relate to the definition of property" and that
-[c]ertainly all of the traditional forms of real and personal property fall within this
definition").
164 R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 65 (1985).
165 Lockean theory holds that "natural" individuals gave up to the sovereign only
as much of their "natural liberty" as was necessary to assure public safety and order.
Thus, unlike Hobbes, whose social contract posits the relinquishment of all rights
and the supremacy of positive law, see supra note 161, "Locke searched for the
tertiam quid, that is, for a set of institutional arrangements that would allow individuals to escape the uncertainties and risks of social disorder without having to
surrender to the sovereign the full complement of individual rights." R. EPSTEIN,
supra note 164, at 9-10 (1985).
166 Id. (footnote omitted).
167 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980).
163

168 See

supra note 38 and accompanying text.

See W. PAGE, PAGE OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 3.1, at 64-66 (1960) (citing, among
others, Will of Schaefer, 207 Wis. 404, 241 N.W. 382, for the proposition that there is
an absolute, as opposed to merely a statutory, right to dispose of property as one
chooses).
169
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or a so-called natural right.'

70

The power to make a will "is therefore not a

right protected by any of the constitutional provisions whereby property is
protected ... it is purely a statutory right, subject to the complete control of
the legislature."'' Because the surviving family has no property right in the
cadaveric organs and the potential donor has no property right in disposing
of them by will, there remains only the possibility that the donor has some
property right in his organs after he is dead. It is unlikely that dead bodies
72
have constitutional rights.'
Second, at least one attribute is necessary to qualify a thing as property
under the fifth amendment; it must have value susceptible to exchange
between the owner and some other party. 7 3 As Justice Frankfurter states:
"The value compensable under the Fifth Amendment ...is only that value
which is capable of transfer from owner to owner and thus of exchange for
some equivalent.' 1 74 Since federal law now forbids any person to acquire or
transfer a human organ for valuable consideration,' 175 post-mortem human
organs are not susceptible to exchange for value. 7 6 For this reason alone,
post-mortem organs would seem not to qualify as property under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments; the Constitution, therefore, would seem not to
require any compensation to donors or their survivors when post-mortem
177
organs are conscripted to service.
Right to Privacy Challenges

C.

From the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to
170

W. PAGE, supra

note 169, § 3.1, at 62-63.

171 Id.
172

See infra note 181 and accompanying text.

As Professor Michelman explains, "[l]et us here stipulate that the word
'thing' signifies any discrete, identifiable (even if incorporeal) vehicle of economic
at 1184 n.37 (emphasis added).
174 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
175National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (Supp. 1986); see also supra
notes 92 & 112 and accompanying text.
176 1 am unaware of any case in which it was alleged that the federal ban on organ
sales was unconstitutional on the grounds that there is a fundamental right to buy or
sell organs. Indeed, such an argument would probably not carry much weight in a
country that has, to date, been more concerned with the rights of cadavers than with
the needs of live potential donees. As to when and whether a proscription on sale or
disposition itself constitutes a taking of property in other contexts, see R. EPSTEIN,
supra note 158, at 126-45; J. GELIN & D. MILLER, supra note 158; J. NOWACK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 163, § 11.12.
173

177

But cf. Note, Compulsory Removal of Cadaver Organs, 69 COLUM. L.

REV.

692, 697 (1969) (concluding that cadaver organs constitute property under the fifth
amendment, apparently because the common law recognizes in survivors a "quasiproperty" interest in the cadaver). The conclusions of this Note are persuasively
refuted by Dukeminier. See Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 831-37.
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the United States Constitution, there emerges a right of personal privacy.17

It embodies a "promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will
be kept largely beyond the reach of government ' 1 79 and "the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."'' 0
To begin, the issue of organ donation arises only after an individual has
died, and it is unlikely that a corpse is a "person" as that term is used in
relation to the fourteenth amendment and to all rights to which it gives
rise. 18 The constitutional right to privacy threatens the organ draft only if it
protects a living person's decisions regarding the disposition of her cadaver.
The class of decisions to which the right of privacy extends represents a
matter of no small controversy.18 2 The most recent pronouncements from
the Supreme Court, however, indicate that it extends only to decisions
relating to child rearing, education, family relationships, procreation, contraception, and abortion'83 and, furthermore, that the Court will construe
these words narrowly. In Bowers v. Hardwick,'84 for example, the Court
ruled-albeit over vigorous dissent- 85-that the concepts of family, marriage, and procreation bear no connection to one's decision to engage in
homosexual behavior' 8 6 and, consequently, that such a decision is not pro171 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (stating that "[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy" but that such a right is inherent
in "areas or zones of privacy" to which various constitutional provisions give rise);
id. at 153 (finding a right to privacy in the fourteenth amendment's concept of
personal liberty and attending restrictions upon state action); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 584 (1969) (finding a right to privacy in the first amendment); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (finding right to privacy in the fourth and fifth amendments);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding a right to privacy in
penumbras of the Bill of Rights); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(finding a right to privacy in the ninth amendment).
179 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)
(holding unconstitutional portions of a state statute relating to the regulation of
abortion).
180 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (characterizing past Supreme
Court decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educating as generally limiting the state's powers to
regulate certain kinds of fundamental decisions).
181 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157. The term "person" is used in such a matter
as to apply "only post-natally." No usage suggests prenatal application. Id. Since the
word "person ... does not include the unborn," id., it is logical to conclude that it
also does not include the deceased.
182 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (demonstrating through
powerfully worded plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions the range of positions on these issues).
18I See id. at 190.
184 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
185 Id. at 199-214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 214-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 191.
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tected by the right of privacy. 18 7
Whether the plurality and concurring opinions in Bowers represent honest
interpretation of precedent or a prostitution of jurisprudence, there is now
little reason to believe that the decision to withhold post-mortem organs
would fall within the sphere of constitutionally protected decisionmaking
recognized by the Supreme Court.
Even if the Court were to conclude that an individual's decision regarding
the disposition of her dead body is protected by the right of privacy, it would
likely uphold the proposed organ draft on the ground that it promotes a state
interest of sufficient importance to warrant an intrusion into constitutionally
protected decisionmaking. State interests in obtaining evidence and in public
health already override the individual's "liberty" to be disposed of as she
pleases. Surely, state interests in preserving life are more important than
these other state interests and the invasion no more severe. In the celebrated
privacy decision Roe v. Wade ,188 the Court acknowledged that the right of
privacy is subordinate to statutes that serve "compelling" state interests if
they are "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake." 189 Specifically, it ruled that the physical well-being of an independently viable fetus constituted an interest so compelling as to justify the state
in proscribing a woman's choice of abortion, except where necessary to the
life or health of the mother. 190
It appears, therefore, that the state's interest in preserving a viable fetus
overrides the individual's interest in deciding to procure an abortion. Furthermore, it seems that the state's interest in preserving the health of an
adult woman is stronger even than its interest in the viable fetus. With all of
this in mind, it is hard to imagine that the state's interest in promoting life
through organ transplantation would be insufficient to prevail over the individual's wish to be buried with his organs in place.
It should be observed, perhaps, that according to some state and federal
district courts a constitutional right of privacy protects the morbidly ill
patient who chooses-sometimes through a representative-to terminate
life-sustaining medical treatment. Moreover, in weighing the patient's interest in privacy against the state's asserted interest in preserving his life, these
courts have found more weight on the side of the privacy. 191 These deci187
188

Id.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

See id. at 155.
190 See id. at 164.
191See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 590-91 (1988) (authorizing guardian to
order the termination of life support for a patient who was morbidly and hopelessly
ill); In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 565, 747 P.2d 445, 455 (1987)
(finding that terminally ill patients have a right to refuse artificial means of nutrition
and hydration); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 383, 529 A.2d 419, 428 (1987) (finding no
objective distinction between withholding of artificial feeding and withholding any
other medical treatment); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 430,
189
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sions, however, are not dispositive of the constitutionality of the proposed
organ draft because an individual's interest in preserving his bodily integrity
while alive is not equivalent to the interest in bodily integrity after death.
The individual's decision to have his body buried intact involves far less
significant a privacy interest than his decision to free his living body of
unwanted medical treatment. Similarly, the state's interest in preserving the
life of a morbidly ill patient who wishes to forego medical treatment is far
less significant than its interest in aiding potentially healthy persons who
wish to have their lives prolonged through organ transplantation.
InInre Conroy,'1 92 the Supreme Court of New Jersey wrote that the state's
interest in preserving a patient's life did not override the patient's right to
terminate life-sustaining treatment precisely "because the life that the state
is seeking to protect in such a situation is the life of the same person who has
competently decided to forego the medical intervention; it is not some other
actual or potential life .. . ."91 With an organ draft, the state would seek to
preserve the life of the organ recipient. Any invasion of privacy, therefore,
would be made in order to protect an "other actual . . .life." The state's

interest in this regard should be paramount.
VI.

CONSISTENCY WITH THE NOTIONS OF FREE WILL

Constitutional questions aside, some will find an organ draft contrary to
American notions of free will. Such persons would protest the draft simply
on the ground that Americans should not be forced to do that which they do
not wish to do. David A. Ogden, then president of the National Kidney
Foundation, expressed similar concerns in opposition to a presumed consent
system:
Most of the people I've spoken to, including the Health and Scientific
Affairs Committee of the National Kidney Foundation, feel that pre497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (1986) (holding that a right to refuse treatment arises both from
common law and the unwritten penumbral constitutional right to privacy); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143-46, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305-07 (1986)
(authorizing a morbidly and hopelessly ill patient to order the termination of life
support); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 374, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985) (holding that the
patient had the right to decline any medical treatment, including artificial feeding);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984)
(holding that the right of a competent adult patient to refuse medical treatment is a
constitutionally guaranteed privacy right that must not be abridged); Inre Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1970) (holding that the right of privacy is broad enough
to encompass an incompetent patient's decision to decline medical treatment even if
that decision might lead to death); ci: In re Eichner, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 271-72, 420
N.E.2d 64, 70 (1981) (holding that the right to privacy gives rise to the right of a
guardian to apply to court for authority to have life support systems removed).
1"I In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
193 Id. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223.
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sumed consent is not quite the American way. It is relatively coercive,
compared to the more classical freedom of choice that characterizes our
way of life. Consent should be positive, not implied. 19
It is doubtful, however, that these objections are truly related to incompatibilities between the American way and coercion per se. The American
way, after all, permits military draft and compulsory gifts to the poor
through social "welfare" laws. Indeed, as to the very question of dead
bodies, every state in this republic mandates autopsy in cases of suspicious
death without regard to the wishes of the decedent or her family, and many
195
order autopsy to furnish evidence in civil cases.
If the American way does not permit an organ draft it must be for some
reason other than the impairment of free will. It cannot be that an organ draft
of dead bodies is objectionable as a violation of free will but that a military
draft of living bodies is not. It cannot be that the need for evidence in
criminal and civil cases is more vital than the need for organs in cases of
suffering and impending death.
Rather, the opposition to an organ draft would probably relate to this
unfortunate phenomenon: Americans deplore the idea that any individual
should be required to give even the smallest gift of good or service to any
other individual, no matter how great the need. It is a sturdy, common-law
principle that a citizen has no duty to offer aid to another in peril, no
matter how safe and easy a helping gesture might be. 196 An expert swimmer
equipped with boat and rope may sit, smoke, and sunbathe while a fellow
citizen drowns before her eyes. 97 Even if one coaxes another into the water,
she need give no aid when the latter starts to drown. 198 One need not help a
stranger who is bleeding to death' 99 or stop a small child from hammering a
'9

1983).
195

Ogden, Another View on Presumed Consent, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28 (Dec.
See supra note 40.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (summarizing that
"(t]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary
for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose on him a duty to take such
action"); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 375 (5th ed. 1984) (noting
that "the law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of
196

common humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even if
the other is in danger of losing his life").
197 Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 76, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (1928) (stating that failure
to respond to deceased's cries infringed no legal right of the decedent).
198 Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 321-22, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (1959) (stating that the
mere fact that another person is in a position of peril imposes no legal duty on the
potential rescuer).
199 Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 463, 36 S.E. 810, 810 (1900) (stating that no cause

of action arises from a failure to perform an act of humanity, if such failure involves
no breach of duty imposed by law); Riley v. Gulf, C.&S.F. Ry., 160 S.W. 595, 597
(Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (declaring that the law does not impose an affirmative duty to
assist another in distress).
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dangerous explosive.2 0 0 One has no duty to move her vehicle from the path
of a fire engine en route to a burning home 20 1 or to cry warning to one
20 2
unwittingly headed for the jaws of a dangerous machine.
Although many writers have denounced the no-duty-to-rescue rule, 20 3 it is
slow to weaken. 204 It has been suggested that state legislatures override the
common law by enacting statutes that create a duty to rescue. 20 5 Only two
states have taken the suggestion. 20 6 In all other states the no-duty-to-rescue

Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756, 759 (Okla. 1955) (declaring that where a 16
year-old boy was playing with explosives at the home of a companion and the latter's
parents, none was under a duty to prevent the boy from hammering a pipe which
contained explosives).
201 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Scruggs,
161 Ala. 97, 49 So. 399, 400 (Ala. 1909)
(stating that there is no duty to aid in preservation of another's property).
202 Buch v. Armory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 261, 44 A. 809, 811 (1897) (stating that
there is a great difference between causing an injury and preventing it; the duty to
protect against wrong is a moral obligation only and is not recognized or enforced by
law).
203 Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A ProposedRule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499, 499-503, 509
(1965) (proposing adoption of a duty to act rule in order to promote morality in the
community).
204 The common law does recognize a duty to give affirmative aid where
parties
manifest a "special relationship" such as common carrier-passenger, and inn200

keeper-guest.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

TORTS

§ 314A (1965); W.

PROSSER &

W.

supra note 196, at 376-77. The definition of such special relationships has
expanded over the course of the century to include (a) owners and invitees, (b) social
hosts and social guests, and (c) companions engaged in a common undertaking. See,
e.g., Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907) (finding a duty of
rescue between a property owner and her invitee); Huthinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d
103, 106-07 (6th Cir. 1947) (finding a duty of rescue between social host and social
guest); Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 292, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1976) (finding a
duty of rescue between companions engaged in a common undertaking).
205 One scholar has suggested that the states adopt a statute with the following
text:
Whoever, witnessing an obvious and imminent danger threatening the life of
another person, fails to come to his aid either through his personal intervention
or by providing aid by others or does not notify immediately the proper public
officer or institution, although he could do one of those things without reasonable fear of danger to his person or to others, shall be punished by imprisonment
of up to .... or a fine of up to .... or both.
KEETON,

Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A ComparativeAnalysis, in
AND THE LAW 91, 123 (Ratcliffe ed. 1981).

THE

GOOD

SAMARITAN

The Minnesota "Good Samaritan law" requires:
Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is
exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the
person can do so without danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable
assistance to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining
206
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rule persists.2 0 7 One explanation for its persistence is that legislators would
have difficulty creating statutory language that would set ascertainable limits
on one's obligation to undertake risk on behalf of another. 20 8 The difficulty in
reducing rights and duties to statutory language is not unique to the problem
20 9
of rescue, however, and this explanation is not particularly persuasive.
A more persuasive explanation for the states' steadfast refusal to create a
private duty to rescue and the reluctance to define its limits in the usual
fashion with words of degree is that the idea of compelling one person to
serve another private person is fundamentally offensive. Whether or not it is
acknowledged, it is this phenomenon that will likely generate the central
objection to the proposed organ draft. The subtle power of Americans'
aversion to compulsory service among private persons is evidenced in an
unreported Pennsylvania chancery decision that approaches the question of
compulsory organ donation. The case involved a patient who required a
bone marrow transplant. He was well-matched immunologically to his
cousin who refused, however, to cooperate with transplantation. The patient
sought an injunction ordering his cousin to donate. In response, the court
stated that

or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. Any
person who violates this section is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.5 (1988). Vermont's "Emergency medical care" statute is
similar. See VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
207 Approximately thirteen European nations, however, have imposed upon their
citizens a duty to rescue one another from danger. See Rudzinski, supra note 205, at
91-92. The Dutch Penal Code, for example, provides that one who, witnessing the
danger of death with which another is suddenly threatened, neglects to give or furnish
him such assistance as he can give or procure without reasonable fear of danger to
himself or others, shall be punished, if the person in distress dies, by a detention of
three months at most and a fine of 300 florins at most. Id. at 126.
208 See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 196, at 376.
[T]hus far the difficulties of setting any standards of unselfish service to fellow
men, and of making any workable rule to cover possible situations where fifty
people might fail to rescue one, has limited any tendency to depart from the rule
to cases where some special relation has offended a justification for the creation
of a duty, without any question of setting up a rule of universal application.
Id.
209 Courts and legislatures often announce rules, new rights, and new liabilities,
many of which depend for their existence on manners of degree. Indeed, as Justice
Holmes observed, there ought to be no special worry over legal distinctions that turn
upon "differences of degree":
The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized ... Negligence is all degree...
and between the variations according to distance that I suppose to exist and the
simple universality of the rules in the Twelve Tables or the Leges Barbarorum,
there lies the culture of two thousand years.
LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914) (Holmes, J.,
concurring in part).

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 721 1988

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68: 681

the common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that one
human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to rescue or to
take action to save another ....
[T]he rule is founded upon the very
essence of our free society ....

For our law to compel the Defendant to

submit to an intrusion of his body would change the very concept and
principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the
sanctity of the individual and would impose a rule which would know21no
0
limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn.
The case involved a living donor, but it nonetheless indicates that the
strongest resistance to an organ draft would derive from the deep-rooted
American objection to coerced individual giving.
On the other hand, Americans do not object very strenuously when they
are required to give payment or service to the "government" to solve a
"public" problem or answer a "public" need. Perhaps the distinction between these two ostensibly antithetical positions-compelled aid to the poor
through tax supported assistance programs and no compulsion to rescue-is
that aiding the poor is understood generally as contributing to a public need,
while rescue is viewed as compelled aid in response to a private need. For
example, a citizen would likely find abusive a statute requiring contribution
to a specific college student who needs help with tuition. The benefit to the
citizen is not readily apparent. Yet the citizen will not protest paying taxes
each year so that her government might use the proceeds to address the
"public" issue of higher education and the "public" problem of tuition costs
by subsidizing the same college student. If the citizen perceives the contribution as serving the public, of which she is a part, she will not likely feel
abused. The proposed Model Organ Draft Act is best characterized not as
coerced private donation but as a measure related to the public welfare.
Under its provisions, the government takes organs from cadavers as it now
takes taxes from the paycheck.
CONCLUSION

The Model Organ Draft Act is intended as a sensible and sensitive solution
to a serious national problem. Its passage will signify that the United States
forbids its citizens to bury human organs when they are needed above
ground to serve the cause of national health. All citizens will know that they
stand to benefit from the organ draft should they themselves someday need
organs. Those who object on religious grounds will be exempt from donation
but will stand to benefit nonetheless. All others will participate fully. Such a
scheme promises to answer a pressing American need and, when properly
understood, comports fully with American notions of liberty, charity, and
socialized life.

210

McFall v. Shimp, 127

PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 14,

14-15 (1978).
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APPENDIX:
THE MODEL ORGAN DRAFT ACT
§ 1. Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this Model Organ Draft Act is to increase the number of
human organs and tissues available for transplantation and thus to improve
the prospects for health and longevity of any and all citizens in need of organ
or tissue transplantation.
§ 2. Definitions
(1) "Board" means the Transplant Organ Conscription Board hereinafter
created.
(2) "Conscriptable organ" means kidney, heart, lung, liver, cornea, skin, or
such other bodily parts as the Board may so categorize under Section 4(2)(d)
of this Act.
(3) "Hospital" means a facility licensed, accredited, or approved as a
hospital under the law of any state or a facility operated as a hospital by the
United States government, a state, or a subdivision of a state.
(4) "Donor hospital" means qualified hospital performing the functions
under this Act relating to the removal of conscriptable organs.
(5) "Recipient hospital" means qualified hospital performing the functions
under this Act relating to receipt and transplantation of conscriptable organs.
(6) "Qualified hospital" means any hospital accorded such status under
Section 7(l)(b) of this Act.
(7) "Qualified physician" means physician affiliated with a qualified hospital.
(8) "Prospective donor" means any person so identified pursuant to Section
11(1) of this Act.
(9) "Prospective recipient" means any permanent resident of this state who
provides the Transplant Organ Registry with the information described in
Section 8(1) of this Act.
(10) "Intended recipient" means a person so identified under Section 12 of
this Act.
(11) "Physician" means any person licensed or otherwise authorized to
practice medicine, surgery, or osteopathy under the laws of any state.
(12) "State" means anj state, territory, or possession of the United States,
the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
§ 3. Creation of the Transplant Organ Conscription Board
(1) There shall be created within the Department of Health and Human
Services a Transplant Organ Conscription Board.
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(2) The Board shall consist of eight members appointed by the Governor.
The members shall include:
(a) a physician with expertise in the field of renal transplant;
(b) a physician with expertise in the field of liver transplant;
(c) a physician with expertise in the field of heart and lung transplant;
(d) a physician with expertise in the field of corneal transplant;
(e) a physician with expertise in the field of internal medicine;
(f) a physician with expertise in the field of transplantation immunology;
(g) a religious scholar; and
(h) a permanent resident of this state holding a degree from a four-year
college.
(3) Each member shall serve for so long as she is less than seventy years of
age and willingly fulfills her duties.
(4) The Governor shall appoint the members of the Board by July 1, 19and, thereafter, as vacancies occur. The Board shall begin its existence on
July 1, 19_.
§ 4 Operation of the Transplant Organ Conscription Board
(1)The Board shall meet once during the first week of July to select a
chairperson and secretary from its membership and shall meet at such other
times as may be necessary for the performance of its duties. The Board may
take action only on the concurrence of five of its members. Seven members
shall constitute a quorum:
(2) The Board shall:
(a) make such regulations as are necessary for its operation consistent
with the purposes of this Act;
(b) by regulation interpret the provisions of this Act;
(c) conduct hearings to acquire information necessary to execute its functions under this Act; and
(d) conduct hearings each year to assess the status of all reported organ
transplant procedures in order to determine, once each year, which organs
to add or remove from the category of conscriptable organs.
(3) The Department of Health and Human Services shall:
(a) administer the Board's fiscal duties; and
(b) provide the Board with staff and support services as are necessary and
feasible.
§ 5. Creation of the Transplant Organ Registry
The Board shall:
(1) establish and maintain a Transplant Organ Registry (hereinafter the
"Registry"); or
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(2) arrange for participation in organ procurement registry systems or networks now existing or hereafter created, provided such systems or networks
function, as to citizens of this state, in a manner consistent with this Act.
(3) The Department of Health and Human Services shall provide the Registry with such staff and support services as are reasonably necessary to its
operation.
§ 6. Operation of the Registry
The Registry shall:
(1) be equipped at all times to furnish and shall furnish any qualified hospital
or qualified physician with such information as shall be determined by the
Board under Section 9(1)(a) of this Act.
(2) record information relating to all organ transplants performed under this
Act, including the identity of the donor, recipient, donor hospital, and
recipient hospital.
(3) share its information with other organ procurement registries, agencies,
and networks where such sharing will facilitate organ procurement for residents of this state and of other states.
§ 7. Qualified Hospitals
(1) The Board shall:
(a) by regulation establish standards by which to accord the status of
qualified hospital; and
(b) accord such status to any hospital conforming thereto.
(2) Standards established pursuant to Subsection (a)(1) shall relate to:
(a) the capability of such hospital competently to perform the medical
tasks relevant to provisions of this Act; and
(b) requirements for demonstration by such hospital that guidelines provided by this Act will be followed.
§ 8. Identification of Prospective Recipients
(1) Any permanent resident of this state will be accorded the status of
prospective recipient if she provides the Registry with:
(a) her name, date of birth, residence address, and telephone number;
(b) certification from a physician that she is in need of a conscriptable
organ for transplant;
(c) certification from a qualified hospital and physician that they will
perform necessary medical functions on behalf of such person when a
transplant organ becomes available; and
(d) medical data prescribed by the Board pursuant to Section 9(1)(a) of this
Act, certified by a physician as correct and complete under this Act.
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(2) Information provided pursuant to Subsections (1)(a), (b), (c), and (d) shall
be recorded in the Registry.
§ 9 Standards Relating to Suitability of Organs for Transplantation
(1) The Board shall prescribe:
(a) the nature of medical data concerning the prospective recipient necessary to enable a physician knowledgeable in the area of organ transplant to
determine whether such recipient is suited to any conscriptable organ
available for transplant; and
(b) medical testing techniques whereby such data can be competently
acquired.
(2) The Board shall establish guidelines suggesting:
(a) such medical testing and the acquisition of such medical data concerning a prospective donor necessary for determining whether such donor's
organ is suitable for a particular prospective recipient; and
(b) means of evaluating such medical data and data prescribed under
Subsection (1)(a) of this Section in order to determine whether transplant
between a particular prospective donor and prospective recipient offers a
reasonable medical likelihood of success.
§ 10. Precautions Regarding Death of a Prospective Donor
The Board shall prescribe procedures and precautions designed to ensure
that the declaration of death of any person shall be unrelated to the usability
of such person's organs for transplant.
§ 11. Identification of Prospective Donors
(1) When a patient in a qualified hospital dies, and, under prevailing medical
standards, the attending physician determines that such patient's organs are
likely to be useful for transplant, and such physician has no knowledge that
such patient is not a permanent resident of the United States, such physician
shall:
(a) take such steps as are necessary to preserve the patient's organs for
transplantation (including the mechanical maintenance of respiration and
circulation) without regard for the knowledge or consent of the patient's
family or of the patient during his lifetime; and
(b) contact the Registry to give and receive information as provided in
Subsections (1) and (2).
(2) If the attending physician knows the patient to be a resident of a state
other than this one, he or his representative shall so inform the Registry, and
the Registry shall determine whether such state provides for compulsory
conscription of transplant organs subject only to exemption for contrary
religious belief. If such state does provide for such conscription, the Registry
shall ascertain whether, in such state, the patient is exempted from compul-
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sory organ conscription. If the patient is so exempted or if the attending
physician knows the patient not to be a permanent resident of the United
States, the patient's organs shall not be used for transplant under this Act,
and her cadaver shall be treated and disposed of pursuant to custom and law
that would operate in the absence of this Act.
(3) If the attending physician does not know the patient to be a resident of a
state other than this one, he shall inquire whether the patient is an exempted
donor under Section 16 of this Act and the Registry shall respond to this
inquiry.
(4) If on contacting the Registry under Subsection (1)(b) the qualified physician learns that the patient is an exempted donor under Section 16 of this
Act, the patient's organs shall not be taken for transplantation under this
Act, and the cadaver shall then be treated and disposed of pursuant to
custom and law that would operate in the absence of this Act.
(5) If on contacting the Registry under Subsection (1)(b) the qualified physician learns that the patient is not an exempted donor, he shall identify the
patient as a prospective donor and conduct upon her cadaver the medical
and laboratory testing prescribed under Section 9(2)(a) of this Act with or
without the knowledge or consent of the patient's family or of the patient
during her lifetime.
(6) If on evaluating the results of testing conducted under Section 11(5) of
this Act, the attending physician concludes that one or more of the prospective donor's conscriptable organs are suitable for transplant, such physician
or his authorized representative shall contact the Registry and furnish the
Registry with the results of such medical testing.
§ 12. Identification of Intended Recipient
(1)On being contacted by an attending physician pursuant to Section 11(6) of
this Act, the Registry shall provide the physician or his representative with
the information described in Section 6 of this Act.
(2) If on evaluating relevant data pursuant to Section 9(2)(b) of this Act the
attending physician determines that a particular prospective recipient is
suited to an organ of the prospective donor, he shall contact the prospective
donor's physician or other physician affiliated with the qualified hospital
identified with the prospective donor and inform the physician that an organ
is available for use by the prospective recipient. If such physician agrees that
the prospective recipient is suited to the prospective donor's organ or if such
qualified physician is unavailable, the prospective recipient may be identified
as an intended recipient.
(3) If the attending physician concludes that more than one person or
prospective recipient is suited to an organ of the prospective donor he shall
select, on the basis of medical need, one such person or prospective recipient to be identified as intended recipient, except that he must first prefer in
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such identification, a resident of a state that provides for mandatory conscription of transplant organs subject only to religious objection.
§ 13. Removal of Conscriptable Organs
If an intended recipient has been identified and all relevant requirements of
this Act have been observed, a qualified physician shall remove from a
prospective donor's dead body such conscriptable organ or organs as have
been determined under Section 11(6) of this Act to be suitable for transplant.
§ 14. Transportation of Organs
The donor hospital shall make arrangements in accordance with procedures
established by the Board for the transport of the transplant organ or organs
to the recipient hospital or hospitals.
§ 15. Expenses of Transplant
Expenses incurred in connection with removal and transport of the transplant organ shall be charged to the intended recipient who shall be liable
therefore.
§ 16. Religious Exemption
(1) Any permanent resident of this state who notifies the Board in writing
that she has a religious objection to conscription of her own organs or those
of her minor child shall be accorded a hearing for the purpose of determining
whether such person or child will receive a certificate of religious exemption.
(2) If at such hearing such person establishes her religious objection, the
Board shall furnish such person a certificate of religious objection and
record, in the Registry, her status as exempted donor.
(3) For purposes of this Section, a religious objection is one that arises from
a person's beliefs regarding the duties and obligations imposed on her by her
god.
(4) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Board under this Section may
appeal to the

-

Court of the county in which she resides.

§ 17. Application of this Act
This Act shall not apply to a person who is not a permanent resident of the
United States and such person's organs shall not be used for transplant
under this Act.

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 728 1988

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 729 1988

VOLUME 68

NUMBER 4

JULY 1988

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor-in-Chief
MICHAEL CHINMAN

Managing Editor
D. KING

ABIGAIL

Executive Editors

Note Editors

Article Editors

RAINA H. FISHBANE
MATTHEW B. MCCUTCHEN

NEIL W. BASON
LYNN GOODMAN
DEBORAH J. HART
MARJORIE JACOBSON
KIM M. RUBIN
VERONICA SERRATO

LISAMICHELLE DAVIS

Topic and
Book Review Editor
SUSAN KRUMHOLZ RIDKER

EDWARD A. FALLONE
JAMES NEWMAN
MITCHELL C.

STEIN

EDITORS
LINDA F. GOLDWYN
HARRY M. GUTFLEISH
GENE A. HALDEMAN
BEVERLY HJORTH
MARLA S. KIRSH
DAVID MADOFF
DAVID MARDER
HAROLD P. MINTZ
CRAIG S. PRUSHER
MARY H. SEMINARA
ELISE D. WEAKLEY

AMY ABRAMOWITZ
JOSEPH BECKMAN
MICHAEL L. CHINITZ
ROBERT CHISHOLM
JOHN J. D. CLANCY
ROBERT COOLEY
JEFFREY S. DANTOWITZ
SHEREE I. FABRIKANT
KENNETH JAY GOLDBERG
MELISSA GOLDMAN

STAFF
EDWIN PACKARD ARO
CHARLES S. BEAL
RUSSELL BECK
LAURA CHENOWETH
DOUGLAS COBLENS
STEVEN ANDREW COHEN
MICHAEL A. CONLEY
CATHLEEN DAWE
PATRICIA A. DEBENEDICTIS
VICKI L. EHRLICHMAN
DAVID A. FORMAN
JULIE A. FROHLICH

ALAN J. GLASS
DAVID GOLDBERG
EILEEN HALE
KATHERINE HAZARD

JODY L. IRWIN
DAVID B. KAPLIN
JOSHUA KATZ
KAREN L. KATZ
PATRICIA ANNE KUHN
ARTHUR LABY
GREGORY MARK Loss

ANDREW MELNICK
NEAL MERKER
NICHOLAS V. MOROSOFF
MICHAEL P. PAPPAS
KATHERINE L. PARKS

DOV H. SCHERZER
MARY C.

SCURLOCK

SARAH A. STAFFORD
GARDNER N. STRATTON
HEIDI MARIE VAN
BENJAMIN ANDREW
ZELERMYER

Faculty Advisor
WILLIAM E. RYCKMAN, JR.

Publication Assistant
RITA EDELSTON

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 730 1988

VOLUME 68

NUMBER 4

JULY 1988

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor-in-Chief
MICHAEL A. CONLEY
Managing Editor
GREGORY MARK LOSS

Execative Editors
EILEEN M. HALE
NICHOLAS V. MOROSOFF

Topic and
Book Review Editor

Note Editors

Article Editors

CHARLES S. BEAL
PATRICIA A. DEBENEDICTIS
VICKI L. EHRLICHMAN

STEVEN ANDREW COHEN
KATHERINE W. HAZARD

BENJAMIN ANDREW ZELERMYE R

DAVID B. KAPLIN
ANDREW J. MELNICK

JOSHUA KATZ
PATRICIA ANNE KUHN
ARTHUR B. LABY

EDITORS
EDWIN PACKARD ARO
RUSSELL BECK
LAURA CHENOWETH

JODY L. IRWIN
KAREN L. KATZ

DOUGLAS COBLENS
CATHLEEN DAWE
DAVID A. FORMAN
JULIE A. FROHLICH

MICHAEL P. PAPPAS
KATHERINE L. PARKS
DoV H. SCHERZER
MARY C. SCURLOCK

ALAN J. GLASS
DAVID L. GOLDBERG

SARAH

NEAL

E.

A.

MERKER

STAFFORD

GARDNER N. STRATTON
HEIDI MARIE VAN

STAFF
JUDITH BALLAN
JAMES J. BERRIMAN
ROBERT H. BOWEN

DANIEL J. KLAU
SUSAN K. KNAPP
KAY L. LACKEY

JANICE B. REZNICK
JOSEFINA I. ROTMAN

WILLIAM G. BROWN
FRANCIS S. CHLAPOWSKI

DOUGLAS J. LEARY
JILL A. LESSER

JAMES

C. DYKE
ROBYN GOLD
LAWRENCE M. GORDON

MAGDA LUKL
FREDERICK S. MARIUS

MOLLY

TERRIE HANNA
LORI JAYNE HOFFMAN
STEVEN L. KATZ

ELIZABETH SEAMAN

A.

SHUH

KAREN S. SMITH
ANDREW TODD SOLOMON

DAVID MOMBORQUETTE
STEPHEN A.K. PALMER

KATHRYN STANCHI
ANDREA H. STEMPEL
DAVID R. SUNY

PHYLLIS MARINA PARI

JEFFREY WEINSTOCK

JEFFREY POLLACK
MICHAEL REINEMANN

RACHEL A. YATES
LEE SCOTT ZIMMERMAN

Faculty Advisor
E. RYCKMAN,

WILLIAM

JR.

Publication Assistant
RITA EDELSTON

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 731 1988

The Boston University Law Review Staff
for the 1988-89 academic year

JUDITH BALLAN

DAVID MOMBORQUETTE

J.

STEPHEN A. K. PALMER
PHYLLIS MARINA PARi

JAMES

BERRIMAN

H. BOWEN
WILLIAM G. BROWN
ROBERT

FRANCIS S. CHLAPOWSKI
MOLLY

C.

DYKE

M.

MICHAEL REINEMANN

B.

JANICE

REZNICK

JOSEFINA I. ROTMAN

ROBYN GOLD
LAWRENCE

JEFFREY POLLACK

GORDON

ELIZABETH SEAMAN

A.

TERRIE HANNA

JAMES

LORI JAYNE HOFFMAN

KAREN S. SMITH
ANDREW TODD SOLOMON

STEVEN
DANIEL
SUSAN

L. KATZ
J. KLAU
K. KNAPP

SCHUH

KATHRYN STANCHI

H. STEMPEL
R. SUNY

ANDREA

KAY L. LACKEY

DAVID

DOUGLAS J. LEARY
JILL A. LESSER

JEFFREY WEINSTOCK

MAGDA LUKL

LEE SCOTT ZIMMERMAN

RACHEL

A.

YATES

FREDERICK S. MARIUS

HeinOnline -- 68 B.U. L. Rev. 732 1988

